United States v. Evans

United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 2025 · Evidence
Evidencewillful blindnessdeliberate ignorance18 U.S.C. § 666federal programs theftbenefits elementFischer structure operation and purposewire fraud

Facts

Evans, a longtime Boston Police Department captain, supervised the Evidence Control Unit, where officers worked purge overtime. Although BPD overtime materials required officers to report actual hours worked and purge overtime was paid under code "three" on an hour-by-hour basis, Evans and his subordinates regularly submitted slips certifying four-hour shifts when they often stopped work by 5:30 or 6:00 P.M., and many slips claimed time when the unit was already closed and alarmed. At trial, the government also sought to prove the § 666 federal-benefits element through evidence that BPD received a Community-based Violence Prevention Grant and a VAWA STOP Grant, but offered only sparse testimony about those grants' purposes and operation.

Issue

Whether the district court properly gave a willful blindness instruction, and whether the government introduced sufficient evidence that BPD received more than $10,000 in federal "benefits" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 666(b). The court also considered whether various unpreserved instructional and evidentiary claims amounted to plain error.

Rule

A willful blindness instruction is proper when the defendant claims lack of knowledge, the facts suggest a conscious course of deliberate ignorance, and the instruction does not mandate an inference of knowledge. For § 666(b), not all federal funds are "benefits"; the government must present evidence of the federal program's structure, operation, and purpose sufficient to show the money qualifies as benefits, not merely identify the grant and amount.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In Phoenix, Nora Patel managed overtime approvals for a city property warehouse. She testified that she did not know her staff's timesheets were false, but the evidence showed she had repeatedly seen employees leave after one hour, approved claims for three hours anyway, and never asked payroll or her supervisors whether that practice was permitted even though the written forms required reporting actual hours worked.

Should the trial judge give a willful blindness instruction?

Explanation. A willful blindness instruction is proper when the defendant claims lack of knowledge, the facts suggest a conscious course of deliberate ignorance, and the instruction does not require the jury to infer knowledge. Direct evidence of deliberate avoidance is unnecessary; suspicious flags left uninvestigated can suffice. Here, Nora denied knowledge, encountered obvious signs of falsity, and failed to take basic investigatory steps. (Derived from United States v. Evans (n.d.).)