United States v. Feldman

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2019 · Evidence

EvidencePlea agreementsRestitutionForfeitureplea agreementmerger clauseparol evidencestrict construction against government

Facts

Feldman pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement requiring forfeiture of certain accounts and restitution to the victim university. Feldman asserted, and the government did not deny, that during plea negotiations the prosecutor undertook to recommend that the forfeited funds be restored to the victims and credited against restitution, while making clear DOJ retained final discretion; the written plea agreement said the government may recommend restoration and contained a merger clause. After sentencing, one AUSA sent DOJ a letter recommending restoration, but later sent an addendum identifying Feldman's previously known retirement account and stating that information was vital because the victim might have recourse to other assets. DOJ then denied restoration on the ground that Feldman could satisfy restitution through other assets, and the government sought execution on the retirement account.

Issue

Whether the district court erred in denying relief by treating the written plea agreement and merger clause as dispositive and by concluding that the government's duty was satisfied merely because it formally sent a restoration request. More specifically, the question was whether, under the standards governing plea agreements, the government may have failed to fulfill or may have undermined promises or representations made during plea negotiations, such that further factfinding was required.

Rule

Plea agreements are not interpreted solely under ordinary commercial contract principles. Courts may look beyond the four corners of a plea agreement, construe ambiguities and obligations strictly against the government, and consider oral and written prosecutorial representations even when the agreement contains a merger clause, particularly where questions exist about fairness, good faith, inducement, or fulfillment of prosecutorial promises. When a plea rests in any significant degree on a prosecutor's promise, that promise must be fulfilled, and the prosecutor's office is treated as a single entity responsible for communicating relevant information among its attorneys.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Buffalo, federal prosecutors negotiating with Evan Mercer told him they would recommend that forfeited funds be applied to victim compensation, while emphasizing that a Justice Department unit would make the final decision. The written plea agreement later stated only that the government "may, in its discretion" make such a recommendation and included a merger clause declaring that no other promises existed.

If Mercer later argues that the prosecutors' earlier statements are relevant to whether the government fulfilled its obligations, what is the best answer?

Explanation. The majority held that plea agreements are not treated like ordinary private contracts. Courts may look beyond the four corners, construe ambiguities strictly against the government, and consider oral and written prosecutorial representations even when the agreement contains a merger clause. Thus the merger clause is not automatically conclusive. (Derived from United States v. Feldman (n.d.).)