United States v. Grace (2006)

United States District Court for the District of Montana · 2006 · Evidence
439 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Mont. 2006)
Updated
EvidenceseveranceRule 14joint trialsattorney-client privilegeSixth Amendmentright to present a defenseadvice of counsel

Facts

The defendants were jointly charged, including a conspiracy count that named every defendant. Several individual defendants argued that a joint trial would cause spillover prejudice, especially from evidence the government might seek to admit under Rule 404(b) only against Grace. Other individual defendants intended to raise an advice-of-counsel defense and claimed they needed to introduce documents and testimony covered by Grace's attorney-client privilege. The court reviewed the privileged materials in camera and found that some documents submitted by several individual defendants could be sufficiently probative and exculpatory to require admission despite Grace's privilege claim, but that only the materials connected to Favorito and Stringer created a serious fairness problem for a joint trial with Grace.

Issue

Whether the court should sever some or all defendants' trials under Rule 14(a) because of prejudicial joinder, the projected length and complexity of trial, and the need of certain individual defendants to introduce attorney-client privileged communications of co-defendant Grace in support of an advice-of-counsel defense. Also, whether the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense can require admission of otherwise privileged attorney-client communications.

Rule

Severance under Rule 14(a) should be granted only when joinder is so manifestly prejudicial that it outweighs the strong preference for joint trials, or when there is a serious risk that a joint trial will compromise a specific trial right or prevent a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. In resolving a conflict between a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense and another party's attorney-client privilege, the court must balance the exculpatory and probative value of the privileged evidence against the policies served by the privilege; the privilege may yield in limited instances when exclusion would significantly undermine the defendant's defense. But severance is required only if admission of the privileged material in a joint trial would prejudice the privilege-holder's trial rights, not merely its confidentiality interest.

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Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In a federal conspiracy prosecution in Denver, a fictional chemical distributor and five former managers are tried together. One manager, Omar Velez, is charged only in the conspiracy count and argues that evidence of the company's unrelated prior regulatory misconduct may be admitted only against the company and will cause the jury to convict him by association.

How should the court rule on Omar's motion to sever?

Explanation. Rule 14 severance is exceptional. The court begins from a strong preference for joint trials, especially in conspiracy cases, and severance is warranted only if joinder is so manifestly prejudicial that it outweighs judicial economy, or if a joint trial seriously risks compromising a specific trial right or reliable verdicts. Mere spillover concerns and the fact that some evidence may be admitted only against a co-defendant do not suffice, particularly if limiting instructions can cabin the evidence.