United States v. Monsanto Co.

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 1989 · Property

PropertyCERCLA liabilityhazardous waste cleanupjoint and several liabilityCERCLAsection 107(a)strict liabilitysite owner liability

Facts

Seidenberg and Hutchinson owned the Bluff Road property and leased it first to COCC and then accepted rent from SCRDI, which used the site to store and dispose of hazardous chemical waste. Between 1976 and 1980, SCRDI haphazardly placed more than 7,000 drums of chemical waste at the site, causing leaks, fumes, fires, and explosions, and the EPA concluded the site posed a major fire hazard. The governments arranged a cleanup, and logs from the cleanup documented drums and containers bearing the labels or markings of Allied, Monsanto, and EM Industries; after partial cleanup, containers labeled with each generator's insignia remained at the site, and samples revealed hazardous substances like those contained in their wastes. The governments sued the non-settling site owners and generators under CERCLA section 107(a) to recover cleanup costs.

Issue

Whether the site owners and off-site waste generators were properly held liable on summary judgment under CERCLA section 107(a), including whether CERCLA requires proof that each generator's specific waste caused the harm, whether defendants established any section 107(b) defense, whether joint and several liability was proper, and whether prejudgment interest should be reconsidered under the amended statute.

Rule

CERCLA section 107(a) creates a strict liability scheme. A site owner is liable under section 107(a)(2) if the person owned the facility at the time hazardous substances were disposed there and a release or threatened release occurred; an off-site generator is liable under section 107(a)(3) when it arranged for disposal of hazardous substances at a facility containing hazardous substances like those in its waste, and a plaintiff need not trace ownership of each specific chemical compound found at the site. Joint and several liability is permitted when the environmental harm is single and indivisible, and the burden is on defendants to prove a reasonable basis for apportionment; section 107(b) defenses are limited causation defenses and must be proved by the defendant.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In 2018, Lena Ortiz and Daniel Pike owned a warehouse lot in Akron, Ohio. They had leased it to Riverbend Solvents LLC since 2015, and during their ownership Riverbend stored deteriorating drums of hazardous chemicals there; leaking liquids later migrated into the soil, prompting state cleanup costs.

Under the governing rule, are Lena and Daniel liable for response costs as owners?

Explanation. Section 107(a)(2) imposes strict liability. Ownership at the time of disposal, plus a release or threatened release causing response costs, is enough. The majority rejected any requirement of personal participation, intent, or negligence for owner liability.