United States v. Nelson

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2002 · Evidence

277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002)

Updated August 22, 2026

Evidence18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B)Thirteenth Amendmentbadges and incidents of slaveryprivate conductracially or religiously motivated violenceJewish victimspublic facility

Facts

After a traffic accident in Crown Heights involving a Jewish driver and two African-American children, an angry crowd gathered and voiced complaints about Jews and alleged preferential treatment. Price addressed the crowd with anti-Jewish statements, urged action against Jews, and the crowd, including Price and Nelson, moved toward Jewish areas. Rosenbaum, an Orthodox Jew walking on a Brooklyn city street, was spotted, chased, beaten by a group including Nelson, and stabbed by Nelson after the attack. At trial, the district court openly sought a racially and religiously balanced jury, denied a for-cause challenge to Juror 108 despite his admitted doubts about impartiality, and later helped place him on the main jury panel through out-of-order substitutions based on race and religion.

Issue

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B), as applied to defendants who attacked a Jewish victim on a city street, is constitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment and supported by sufficient evidence of the statute's required motive and intent. Whether the convictions must nonetheless be vacated because the district court seated an actually biased juror as part of an improper race- and religion-based jury selection process.

Rule

Section 245(b)(2)(B) is constitutional as applied under Congress's Section Two Thirteenth Amendment power because Congress may rationally determine that private violence motivated by a victim's race or religion and aimed at the victim's use of public facilities constitutes a badge or incident of slavery. The statute requires proof of two distinct elements: class-based motive against the victim because of race, religion, color, or national origin, and activity-based intent to interfere with, prevent, deter, or punish the victim's use of a state-provided facility. A city street is a public 'facility' within the statute. A conviction must be vacated when an actually biased juror is seated, and consent does not validly waive that objection when obtained through an improper race- and religion-based jury arrangement.

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

The court's holding and reasoning
Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case

Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In a federal assault trial in Philadelphia, prospective juror Daniel Reiss says during voir dire that he closely followed the defendant's earlier state prosecution and felt "upset" when the defendant was acquitted. When the judge asks whether he can be fair, Daniel answers, "I would like to think so, but honestly I don't know." The judge denies a for-cause challenge, and Daniel ultimately serves on the jury.

If the defendant is convicted and appeals, what is the strongest argument for reversal?

Explanation. A juror shows actual bias when voir dire reveals a state of mind indicating the juror cannot act with entire impartiality. A statement like "I honestly don't know" whether he can be fair, especially when tied to disappointment about the defendant's prior acquittal, requires removal for cause unless the juror gives a clear affirmative assurance of impartiality. Seating that juror is structural error requiring vacatur.