United States v. Shipp (2019)

United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York · 2019 · Evidence

422 F. Supp. 3d 762 (E.D.N.Y 2019)

Updated August 22, 2026

EvidenceFourth AmendmentSearch warrantsDigital searchesFacebook account warrantsExclusionary ruleGood-faith exceptionparticularity

Facts

A magistrate judge issued a warrant directing Facebook to disclose a wide range of data associated with a specific Facebook user ID that investigators believed belonged to Shipp. The supporting affidavit tied Shipp to the account through public photos, birthday references, posts using the nickname "Pump," and photos showing what appeared to be a bandage on his lower left arm, which matched surveillance footage from the shooting investigation. The warrant required disclosure of extensive account data but authorized seizure only of information constituting evidence of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) involving Shipp since January 1, 2018. Facebook produced 21,471 pages, and the government identified several messages and posts it contended were seizable under the warrant.

Issue

Whether evidence obtained from Shipp's Facebook account should be suppressed because the Facebook warrant was overbroad and lacked sufficient particularity under the Fourth Amendment. If the warrant was constitutionally defective, the further question was whether the Leon good-faith exception nonetheless barred suppression.

Rule

A warrant must identify the specific offense for which probable cause exists, describe the place to be searched, and specify the items to be seized by their relation to designated crimes. Overbreadth and particularity are distinct inquiries, with overbreadth turning on whether probable cause supports the authorized scope of the search. Even if a warrant is invalid, suppression is not required where officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on it; the good-faith exception does not apply only if the magistrate was knowingly misled, wholly abandoned the judicial role, the affidavit was so lacking in probable cause as to make reliance unreasonable, or the warrant was so facially deficient that reliance was unreasonable.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Phoenix, federal agents investigating a suspected felon-in-possession offense obtained a warrant for a social media account used by Devin Morris. The warrant named the account by user ID, identified 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) as the offense, and authorized seizure of messages, photos, and location data constituting evidence of firearm possession during 2023.

If Devin argues the warrant failed the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement, which argument is weakest?

Explanation. The majority opinion states that particularity requires three things: identification of the specific offense, description of the place to be searched, and specification of items to be seized by their relation to designated crimes. This warrant appears to satisfy those elements. The court expressly noted the Second Circuit has not required rigid search protocols or minimization undertakings as basic predicates, and it did not treat all social-media warrants as automatically invalid.