Vaca v. Sipes

Supreme Court of the United States · 1967 · Labor Law

386 U.S. 171 (1967)

Updated August 1, 2026

Labor Lawduty of fair representationunion grievance handlingarbitrary discriminatory or bad faithGarmon preemptionsection 301exhaustion of contractual remediesarbitration

Facts

Owens, a Swift employee with a history of high blood pressure, was discharged after Swift's doctor concluded his health made him unfit for work, even though Owens had obtained outside medical certifications of fitness. The union processed his grievance through the fourth step of the contractual grievance procedure and gathered additional medical evidence at union expense, but the new examination did not support Owens' position. The union then decided not to take the grievance to arbitration because it believed the medical evidence was insufficient, suggested rehabilitation alternatives, and ultimately dismissed the grievance. Owens sued the union, claiming it arbitrarily and without just cause refused to arbitrate his grievance.

Issue

Whether Owens' fair representation claim against the union was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB because the conduct was arguably an unfair labor practice, and if not, what federal standard governs union liability for refusing to take a grievance to arbitration. Also at issue was whether the damages awarded against the union were permissible.

Rule

A union, as exclusive bargaining representative, breaches its duty of fair representation only when its conduct toward a bargaining-unit member is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. An employee may sue despite unexhausted contractual grievance remedies when the union has sole power to invoke higher grievance stages and wrongfully refuses to process the grievance, but the employee has no absolute right to have a grievance taken to arbitration. Courts are not preempted from hearing such fair representation claims, and damages must be apportioned according to the injury caused by the employer's breach and the union's breach respectively.

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Nina Flores worked at Lakefront Foundry in Cleveland, Ohio under a collective bargaining agreement administered by Ironline Workers Local 88. After the union declined to pursue her grievance, she sued the union in Ohio state court, alleging it had handled her grievance in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner; the union argues the court lacks power to hear the case because the same conduct is arguably an unfair labor practice within the labor board's jurisdiction.

How should the court rule on the union's jurisdictional objection?

Explanation. The governing rule is that a fair-representation claim is not automatically preempted merely because the same conduct is arguably an unfair labor practice. The majority held that courts retain jurisdiction over this class of claims because the duty of fair representation is a judicially developed doctrine, employees need an assured remedy, and such issues often arise in connection with judicial enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. Federal law governs the claim, but judicial jurisdiction remains available.