Velazquez v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District · 1990 · Criminal Law

561 So. 2d 347 (1990)

Updated August 1, 2026

Criminal Lawcausationvehicular homicideproximate causecause-in-factbut for testsubstantial factordrag racing

Facts

Velazquez and Alvarez agreed to race their cars in a drag race on a public road in Hialeah and completed the agreed quarter-mile course without incident. After crossing the finish line, Alvarez unexpectedly turned around and sped back toward the starting line and a canal; Velazquez also turned around and followed behind him. Alvarez, who had been drinking and was not wearing a seat belt, reached about 123 m.p.h., failed to stop at the end of the road, crashed through a guardrail, flew over the canal, and died instantly, while Velazquez, traveling behind at about 98 m.p.h., also crashed but survived. Velazquez never struck or physically propelled Alvarez's vehicle, and the sole basis for the charge was his participation in the drag race.

Issue

May a driver who participates in a reckless and illegal drag race on a public road be convicted of vehicular homicide for the death of a co-participant driver when the only basis for liability is the defendant's participation in the race? More specifically, was Velazquez's participation a proximate cause of Alvarez's death under the vehicular homicide statute?

Rule

Vehicular homicide has two elements: (1) the defendant must operate a motor vehicle in a reckless manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another, and (2) that reckless operation must be the proximate cause of the death of a human being. Proximate cause includes at least cause-in-fact, ordinarily measured by the but-for test, with a substantial-factor exception in rare concurrent-cause cases, but criminal liability does not attach where, although the defendant's conduct is a cause-in-fact, the victim's own voluntary reckless conduct makes it unjust as a matter of fairness and policy to treat the defendant's conduct as the proximate cause. Thus, a driver-participant in an illegal drag race is not criminally liable for the death of another driver-participant when the deceased effectively kills himself by his own reckless driving and the sole basis for liability is the defendant's participation in the race.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

Late at night in Tampa, Owen Price and Marco Ibarra agreed to race their cars on an industrial road for two blocks. During the race, Marco accelerated far ahead, lost control on a curve, and slammed into a warehouse wall, dying instantly; Owen never touched Marco's car, and the only basis for charging Owen is that he joined the race.

Can Owen properly be convicted of vehicular homicide for Marco's death?

Explanation. The majority held that vehicular homicide requires both reckless driving and proximate cause. Even if Owen's participation was a but-for cause, criminal liability does not attach where fairness and policy make it unjust to treat that conduct as the proximate cause. When the deceased is a co-participant driver who effectively causes his own death through voluntary reckless driving, and the sole basis for liability is the survivor's participation in the race, proximate cause is lacking.