Webb v. McGowin

Alabama Court of Appeals · 1935 · Contracts

Contractsmoral obligationmaterial benefit rulepast considerationassumpsitconsiderationmoral obligationmaterial benefit

Facts

While working for his employer, Webb was dropping a 75-pound pine block from an upper floor when he saw McGowin standing below where the block would fall. To prevent the block from striking McGowin and causing death or serious bodily harm, Webb held onto it and fell with it, diverting its course but suffering severe permanent injuries himself. Afterward, McGowin agreed to care for Webb for life by paying him $15 every two weeks, and he made those payments for more than eight years until his death. Payments ceased shortly after McGowin's death, and Webb sued for the unpaid installments.

Issue

Is a subsequent promise to pay enforceable when the promisee previously, without any prior request, saved the promisor from death or grievous bodily harm and was seriously injured in doing so? More specifically, do the material benefit received by the promisor and the moral obligation arising from it supply sufficient consideration for the later promise?

Rule

When a promisor has received a material or pecuniary benefit from services rendered by the promisee, a subsequent express promise to pay for those services is enforceable because the moral obligation arising from the material benefit is sufficient consideration. In such a case, the later promise operates as an affirmance or ratification of the services and carries a presumption of a previous request. Benefit to the promisor or injury to the promisee is sufficient legal consideration.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Savannah, Nina Torres saw Owen Price pinned beneath a malfunctioning warehouse gate that was about to crush his chest. She shoved the gate aside and pulled him clear, tearing ligaments in her shoulder in the process. Two weeks later, Owen signed a letter promising to pay Nina $900 each month for the rest of her life in gratitude for saving him, but after six months he stopped paying.

If Nina sues for the unpaid installments, which is the strongest argument that Owen's promise is enforceable?

Explanation. The majority rule is that a subsequent express promise to pay is enforceable when the promisor has received an actual material or pecuniary benefit from the promisee's prior act. Saving a person from death or grievous bodily harm counts as a material benefit, and the later promise operates despite no prior request. The opinion does not say injury to the promisee is always required, nor that every moral obligation suffices; it distinguishes mere moral duty from moral obligation tied to material benefit.