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Werth v. Taylor

Michigan Court of Appeals · Torts
TortsBatteryConsentEmergency medical treatmentRefusal of treatmentbatterymedical batteryconsent

Facts

Cindy Werth and her husband, Jehovah's Witnesses, signed forms refusing blood transfusions before and during her hospital admission for the birth of twins. After delivery, Cindy suffered uterine bleeding, and before surgery Dr. Parsons discussed the refusal forms with the couple in the context of what was described as a routine d & c, with reassurances that blood would not be a problem. Cindy was then placed under general anesthesia, her condition deteriorated into a life-threatening emergency, and defendant anesthesiologist Taylor ordered a blood transfusion to preserve her life despite knowing she was a Jehovah's Witness. Cindy was unconscious at the time, and neither Cindy nor Donald was consulted further before the transfusion was given.

Issue

Whether a physician commits battery by authorizing a life-saving blood transfusion for an unconscious patient who had previously signed refusal forms and expressed religious opposition to transfusions, where the refusal was not made contemporaneously with the life-threatening emergency and was not fully informed as to that imminent risk.

Rule

A competent adult may refuse medical treatment, but the law implies consent for an unconscious patient to medical procedures needed to preserve life. In a life-threatening emergency, only a fully informed, contemporaneous refusal by a competent adult patient is sufficient to override medical necessity; without such a refusal, no battery action lies.

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Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In Toledo, Ohio, Mara Ellison signed a clinic form refusing blood products before a scheduled fibroid procedure. During surgery, an unexpected arterial tear caused massive blood loss, and while Mara was unconscious, Dr. Levin ordered a transfusion to prevent death.

If Mara sues Dr. Levin for battery, what is the strongest argument for the physician under the governing rule?

Explanation. A competent adult may refuse treatment, but consent is implied for an unconscious patient when emergency treatment is needed to preserve life. A prior refusal does not support battery unless it was a fully informed, contemporaneous decision by the competent adult patient in the actual emergency. Here, Mara's earlier form was signed before the unexpected crisis, so under the majority rule the transfusion would not constitute battery.