Westchester Day Sch. v. Village of Mamaroneck

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2007 · Property

504 F.3d 338 (2007)

Updated July 23, 2026

PropertyRLUIPAreligious land usesubstantial burdenspecial permitzoningreligious exercisearbitrary and capricious

Facts

Westchester Day School is an Orthodox Jewish day school operating on property in an R-20 district where private schools may operate only with a renewable special permit. The school sought to renovate existing buildings and construct Gordon Hall to remedy inadequate facilities, and the district court found that every part of the proposed project would be used at least in part for religious education and practice. After public opposition arose, the zoning board denied the application outright, citing traffic, parking, and intensity-of-use concerns, though the district court found those reasons unsupported by the record and based on factual errors. The district court also found there were no quick, reliable, or economically feasible alternatives to meet the school's needs and that a new application process would impose major delay and cost.

Issue

Whether the Village's denial of the school's special-permit application imposed a substantial burden on religious exercise in violation of RLUIPA, and if so whether RLUIPA was constitutionally applied in this case. The court also considered whether the Village had preserved or revived a right to a jury trial.

Rule

Under RLUIPA, a land-use regulation violates the statute when it imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise unless the government proves that the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so. In land-use cases, substantial burden is assessed by considering whether the denied project is for religious exercise, whether the denial is absolute or leaves a reasonable opportunity for meaningful resubmission, whether the institution has quick, reliable, and financially feasible alternatives, and whether the government's action is arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful in a way suggesting less than even-handed treatment. Where RLUIPA's interstate-commerce jurisdictional element is satisfied, its application is a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

Cedar Torah Academy in Newark, New Jersey applies to convert an unused library wing into six classrooms, a prayer room, and a counseling room. Trial evidence shows each space will be used at least part of the week for religious instruction or prayer, although some rooms will also host math tutoring and parent meetings.

Under the governing rule, is the proposed project most likely considered "religious exercise" for purposes of RLUIPA?

Explanation. RLUIPA defines religious exercise broadly, including the building or conversion of real property for religious exercise purposes. The key inquiry is whether the proposed facilities are for a religious purpose, not merely whether the institution is religiously affiliated. Where each room will be used at least in part for religious education or practice, the project falls within religious exercise even if some rooms also have secular uses. (Derived from Westchester Day Sch. v. Village of Mamaroneck (2007).)