Williams v. Fermenta Animal Health Company

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1993 · Evidence

984 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1993)

Updated August 22, 2026

EvidenceRule 408settlement evidenceplain errorjudicial commentsclosing argumentAllen chargeharmless error

Facts

Williams claimed Fermenta constructively discharged her from her Technology Assistant position because of her race. At trial, she sought to introduce evidence that an earlier discrimination lawsuit involving a predecessor corporation and Fermenta had settled, after a witness testified about filing that earlier EEOC charge and lawsuit and the EEOC report and complaint were admitted. During trial and closing argument, the judge made comments in front of the jury, and defense counsel suggested jurors could write a letter to company management if they disliked how Williams had been treated. After deliberations, the jury asked whether it could make a recommendation to Fermenta, returned a unanimous verdict for Fermenta, and attached a signed statement criticizing management's handling of personnel problems while stating there was insufficient evidence of racial discrimination.

Issue

Whether the district court committed reversible error by making comments before the jury, excluding settlement evidence from a prior discrimination suit, instructing the jury using a 'determining factor' formulation, permitting an improper closing argument and jury recommendation, and giving an allegedly coercive Allen charge.

Rule

Reversal for excessive judicial intervention requires either actual bias or an abiding impression that the judge's remarks projected advocacy or partiality to the jury; absent objection, review is for plain error. Settlement evidence may be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 408. An instruction using 'determining factor' is functionally a mixed-motive instruction when it defines that phrase to mean the defendant would not have acted but for race and does not require race to be the sole factor. Whether an Allen charge is impermissibly coercive depends on the content of the instruction, the length of deliberation after the charge, the total length of deliberation, and any indicia of coercion or pressure in the record. Improper closing argument warrants reversal only if plainly unwarranted and clearly injurious, and harmless error does not justify reversal.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

At a wrongful-termination trial in federal court in St. Louis, the judge interrupted defense counsel's cross-examination and told the jury, "I do not recall any witness saying the company ever lied about payroll records." The plaintiff did not object. In the final charge, the judge instructed the jury that any comments from the court were not evidence and were not intended to suggest how any issue should be decided.

On appeal, the plaintiff argues the judge's remark requires reversal. What is the strongest response?

Explanation. The governing rule is that unobjected-to judicial comments are reviewed only for plain error. Reversal for excessive judicial intervention requires actual bias or an abiding impression that the judge's remarks projected advocacy or partiality to the jury. Although the comment was improper, the lack of objection, its isolated nature, and the instruction that the court's comments were not evidence make reversal unlikely.