Wood Preserving Corp. v. United States
Facts
Wood Preserving was incorporated in 1955 with $25,000 in initial capital supplied by its sole stockholder, F. Bowie Smith. After startup delays and unexpected costs, Smith advanced or paid on the corporation's behalf almost $130,000 between June 30, 1955, and May 11, 1956, largely for machinery, equipment, improvements, inventory, and initial operating costs. Board minutes stated that Smith would receive 6% interest on open account and up to one-half of interest on bank loans, and so-called interest payments were later credited and paid to him, but no principal repayments were made during the tax years at issue. The advances were not evidenced by notes, had no security, and Smith testified that he intended repayment only if profits were earned.
Issue
Whether the amounts advanced by the corporation's sole shareholder in 1955 and 1956 constituted 'indebtedness' under section 163 of the Internal Revenue Code, so that the corporation could deduct payments to him as interest, or whether the advances were actually contributions to equity capital.
Rule
There is no single decisive characteristic distinguishing debt from equity. The real intention of the parties is important, but it must be determined from all relevant surrounding circumstances rather than testimony alone, and a court need not accept stated intent when the parties' actions are inconsistent with it. Whether advances are loans or capital contributions is a question of fact, and on appeal the district court's finding will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.
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If Blue River later deducts payments to Lena as interest under section 163, which characterization is most likely supported by the governing rule?