Wood v. Board of County Commissioners

Supreme Court of Wyoming · 1988 · Property

Propertydeed interpretationdefeasible feefee simple determinablefee simple subject to condition subsequentspecial limitationright of reentrypurpose clause

Facts

In 1948, Cecil and Edna Wood conveyed 2.1 acres in Riverton, Wyoming, to Fremont County by warranty deed. The deed stated that the tract was conveyed "for the purpose of constructing and maintaining thereon a County Hospital in memorial to the gallant men of the Armed Forces of the United States of America from Fremont County, Wyoming." The county constructed and operated a hospital on the land until 1983, when it sold the land and original hospital facility to a private company; the private company operated a hospital there until 1984 and then moved operations to a new facility. The Woods later sued seeking recovery of the value of the land, claiming the deed language created either a fee simple determinable or a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent.

Issue

Did the deed language stating that the land was conveyed "for the purpose of constructing and maintaining thereon a County Hospital" and as a memorial create either a fee simple determinable or a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, so that the county's estate ended or became terminable when the property ceased being used for a county hospital?

Rule

A conveyance passes all of the grantor's estate unless an intent to pass a lesser estate expressly appears or is necessarily implied in the terms of the grant. To create a fee simple determinable, the deed must clearly contain a special limitation stating the particular circumstances under which the estate will automatically expire; a mere statement of purpose is insufficient. To create a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, the deed must clearly state the grantor's intent to retain a discretionary power to terminate the estate upon a stated event, and such conditions are not favored and are strictly construed.

🔒

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

The court's holding and reasoning
Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case

Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In 1975, Nora Benton conveyed five acres in Laramie, Wyoming, to Cedar Valley School District by warranty deed. The deed stated that the land was conveyed "for the purpose of constructing and operating a public vocational center," and contained no other limiting language; forty years later, the district sold the property to a developer for apartments.

What estate did the school district most likely receive under the deed language?

Explanation. A conveyance passes all of the grantor's estate unless a lesser estate expressly appears or is necessarily implied. Under the majority rule, language stating land is conveyed "for the purpose of" a particular use is merely a purpose clause unless it clearly states the circumstances under which the estate will automatically expire or clearly reserves a right to terminate. Because this deed does neither, the district received a fee simple absolute.