Zinermon v. Burch

Supreme Court of the United States · 1990 · Administrative Law

Administrative LawFederal CourtsProcedural Due ProcessSection 198342 U.S.C. § 1983procedural due processParrattHudson

Facts

Burch was found disoriented and psychotic, taken first to a designated mental health facility and then to Florida State Hospital, where he signed forms requesting voluntary admission and authorizing treatment. Medical records attached to his complaint described him as hallucinating, confused, disoriented, psychotic, semimute, and unable to state why he was hospitalized. He remained confined for about five months without any hearing. Burch alleged that hospital personnel knew or should have known he was incapable of informed consent but nevertheless admitted and kept him as a voluntary patient rather than using Florida's involuntary placement procedures.

Issue

Does a complaint state a § 1983 procedural due process claim when state hospital officials allegedly admit a mentally ill person as a voluntary patient despite knowing or having reason to know he is incompetent to give informed consent, or is the claim barred by Parratt and Hudson because state tort remedies were available after the deprivation? More specifically, was the alleged deprivation the kind of random and unauthorized act for which postdeprivation remedies alone satisfy due process?

Rule

For procedural due process claims under § 1983, the constitutional violation is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide constitutionally adequate process. Parratt and Hudson apply only to the special case in which the deprivation results from random and unauthorized conduct that the State cannot predict or feasibly prevent through predeprivation procedures, making postdeprivation remedies all the process that is due. When the deprivation is foreseeable, occurs at a predictable point, and is carried out by officials to whom the State has delegated the power to effect the deprivation and the duty to provide procedural safeguards, those officials cannot avoid § 1983 liability by characterizing their conduct as random and unauthorized.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

At a state psychiatric center in Columbus, intake nurses are authorized to accept adults as voluntary patients if they sign a consent form. Ohio law also provides an involuntary commitment process with notice, counsel, and a hearing for persons who cannot validly consent. Omar Vega arrives delusional and incoherent, signs the form, and is confined for four months without any hearing; he later sues under § 1983, while adequate state tort remedies for false imprisonment are available.

Which is the strongest argument that Omar's procedural due process claim is not barred by Parratt-Hudson?

Explanation. Parratt-Hudson is a special application of Mathews that applies only when the deprivation results from random and unauthorized conduct the State cannot feasibly predict or prevent through predeprivation procedures. When the risk is foreseeable, occurs at a predictable point, and is carried out by officials to whom the State delegated both the power to effect the deprivation and the duty to provide safeguards, postdeprivation remedies do not automatically satisfy due process.