Abrams v. Chicago

Supreme Court of Illinois · Torts

TortsNegligenceProximate Causeproximate causelegal causecause in factforeseeabilityintervening cause

Facts

Plaintiff called 911 while in labor and requested an ambulance because she had no vehicle, but City dispatchers said labor pains 10 minutes apart were not an emergency and did not send one. After a private ambulance was unavailable, plaintiff's friend drove her to the hospital. On the way, the friend drove through a red light and collided with a car driven by a speeding, substance-impaired driver on a suspended license, seriously injuring plaintiff and resulting in the death of her baby after delivery. Plaintiff alleged that the City's refusal to provide ambulance service caused those injuries.

Issue

Whether the City's refusal to send an ambulance to a woman in labor was the proximate cause of injuries sustained when her private driver ran a red light and collided with a speeding, impaired driver on the way to the hospital. More specifically, the question was whether the City's conduct constituted legal cause, or merely furnished a condition for injuries produced by independent third-party acts.

Rule

Proximate cause has two components: cause in fact and legal cause. Legal cause turns largely on foreseeability and asks whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of the defendant's conduct; when a third person's independent act produces the injury, the question is whether the first wrongdoer reasonably might have anticipated that intervening act as a natural and probable result of its own negligence. If the defendant's conduct merely furnishes a condition by which the injury becomes possible, and the injury is caused by a subsequent independent act of a third person, the defendant's conduct is not the proximate cause.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Milwaukee, Nora Vega called the municipal emergency line seeking an ambulance for severe but noncritical abdominal pain. The dispatcher told her no ambulance would be sent, so her coworker Leo Martin drove her to a clinic; on the way, a street racer ran a red light at high speed and hit Leo's car, injuring Nora.

If Nora sues the city for negligence based on the refusal to send an ambulance, which is the strongest argument that the city was not the proximate cause of her injuries?

Explanation. Under the majority opinion, proximate cause requires both cause in fact and legal cause. Even if the refusal to send aid is a but-for cause, legal cause is lacking when the defendant's conduct merely furnishes a condition and the injury is produced by a subsequent independent third-party act that was not a likely result of the defendant's conduct. Here, the street racer's illegal red-light violation breaks the causal chain as a matter of law.