Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.

Court of Appeals of Georgia · 2008 · Torts

TortsNegligenceSummary JudgmentDuty to RepairProximate CauseAssumption of Riskservice contractnegligent repair

Facts

Anderson bought a Craftsman riding lawnmower from Sears and also purchased a three-year service and repair contract. In 2004, the mower developed shifting problems and backfired; Sears repairmen visited, lubricated the transaxle, and told Anderson they could find nothing wrong, despite evidence that Sears knew of similar complaints and despite Anderson's repeated reports. While mowing for about five hours, Anderson kept her left foot on the brake-clutch pedal as the mower failed to shift and backfired, after which she discovered severe burns and blistering on her feet. After Anderson later reported that the mower was blowing hot air on her foot, Sears replaced the transaxle and other parts, after which the shifting problem and backfiring stopped; later inspection also showed muffler seam separation, increased hot air flow near the left pedal, and flame marks from the exhaust system to that area.

Issue

Whether summary judgment for Sears was proper on Anderson's negligent failure-to-repair claim. Specifically, the question was whether the record showed no genuine issue of material fact as to Sears's duty arising from the service contract, breach of that duty, proximate causation, or whether Anderson's own conduct was the sole proximate cause or constituted assumption of risk as a matter of law.

Rule

To establish negligence, a plaintiff must show a legal duty, breach, causation, and damages. Under Georgia law, when a contract imposes a legal duty, neglect of that duty may sound in tort if the breach also violates a duty owed to the plaintiff independent of the contract to avoid causing harm. Summary judgment is inappropriate on negligence, proximate cause, contributory or comparative negligence, assumption of risk, and lack of ordinary care unless the evidence is plain, palpable, and undisputed. For foreseeability, the defendant need not anticipate the precise injury; it is enough that some injury of a generally injurious nature might reasonably have been foreseen. An intervening act does not break causation if its probable or natural consequences could reasonably have been anticipated by the original wrongdoer.

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In Macon, Georgia, Lena Ortiz bought a home treadmill from Pinecrest Home Supply and also purchased a two-year service plan covering inspection and repair. After repeated complaints that the belt was jerking and the motor casing became unusually hot, Pinecrest technicians came twice under the plan, adjusted the machine, and said they found nothing wrong. Weeks later, the casing overheated during ordinary use and burned Lena's hand when she reached for the stop switch.

If Pinecrest moves for summary judgment on Lena's negligence claim, arguing it owed no tort duty because any obligation arose only from contract, how should the court rule?

Explanation. The majority held that a contract can raise a legal duty, and neglect of that duty may sound in tort when the breach also violates an independent duty to avoid harming the plaintiff. Evidence of a service contract plus actual repair efforts under that contract was enough to create a fact question on duty. So Pinecrest is not entitled to summary judgment merely by labeling the obligation contractual. (Derived from Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (n.d.).)