Banks v. Dretke

Supreme Court of the United States · 2004 · Federal Courts

Federal CourtsHabeas CorpusBradyCertificate of AppealabilityBradymaterialitycause and prejudicefederal habeas

Facts

Before trial, the State told Banks's counsel it would provide all discovery to which he was entitled, but it withheld evidence that prosecution witness Robert Farr was a paid police informant who had helped set up Banks's trip to Dallas and had received money from Deputy Sheriff Huff. The State also allowed Farr to testify falsely that he had not taken money from police, had not given police a statement, and had not talked to officers about the case, and it continued denying or concealing the information during state postconviction proceedings. In federal habeas proceedings, an evidentiary hearing revealed Farr's informant status and payment, and discovery of prosecution files also produced a transcript showing that another key witness, Charles Cook, had been intensively coached before trial despite testimony suggesting otherwise. The prosecution had relied heavily on Farr's testimony at the penalty phase to show that Banks would commit future violent acts.

Issue

Whether Banks showed cause and prejudice sufficient to overcome his failure to develop evidence in state court on his Brady claim concerning Farr's paid-informant status, and whether the Fifth Circuit erred in denying a certificate of appealability on Banks's Brady claim concerning the suppressed Cook coaching transcript. More specifically, the Court considered whether a defendant may rely on the State's assurances of disclosure and whether Rule 15(b) may permit treatment of an unpleaded habeas claim as if pleaded when tried by consent.

Rule

Under pre-AEDPA habeas law, a petitioner is entitled to develop a Brady claim in federal court if he shows cause for failing to develop the facts in state court and actual prejudice; in this context, cause exists when the State suppressed the evidence and the petitioner reasonably relied on the State's representation that all Brady material had been disclosed, especially when the State later confirmed that representation, and prejudice exists when the suppressed evidence is material under Brady. Brady materiality is satisfied when the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict, i.e., there is a reasonable probability of a different result. In pre-AEDPA habeas proceedings, Rule 15(b) may apply so that an unpleaded claim tried by express or implied consent may be treated as if raised in the pleadings, and a certificate of appealability should issue when reasonable jurists could debate the district court's resolution.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In a pre-AEDPA capital case from Tulsa, the prosecutor wrote defense counsel before trial that the State would provide all exculpatory and impeachment material without motion practice. Years later, during a federal habeas evidentiary hearing, a sheriff’s file revealed that the State had paid its key sentencing witness $500 and let him deny any payment at trial; in state postconviction proceedings, the State had also denied the prisoner’s allegation that the witness was working with police.

Which is the best analysis of whether the prisoner can show cause for failing to develop this Brady evidence in state court?

Explanation. Under the majority opinion, cause in this Brady setting parallels the suppression element. Cause exists when the State withheld favorable evidence and the petitioner reasonably relied on the State’s representation that all Brady material had been disclosed, especially when the State later confirmed that representation in collateral proceedings. The Court rejected any rule requiring the defendant to uncover concealed material on his own despite the State’s assurances, and bad faith is not required.