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Barnhill v. Davis

Supreme Court of Iowa · 1981 · Torts
TortsNegligent infliction of emotional distressBystander recoveryemotional distressbystanderforeseeabilitysummary judgmentzone of danger

Facts

Barnhill was driving ahead of his mother, Grace Maring, and had pulled over near an intersection to wait for her after passing through it safely. From his car, about three car lengths from the intersection, he saw Maring's car struck on the driver's side by a car driven by Rose Marie Davis and owned by James A. Davis. Maring was only slightly bruised, but Barnhill claimed he suffered emotional distress from fear for his mother's safety, with resulting back and leg pain, dizziness, and difficulty sleeping. His petition sought damages for that distress, and his doctor confirmed some physical symptoms.

Issue

May a bystander who is not himself in physical danger recover in Iowa for emotional distress and its consequences resulting from fear for the safety of another person caused by the defendant's negligence? If so, did Barnhill generate a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to survive summary judgment?

Rule

A bystander may recover in Iowa for emotional distress caused by witnessing peril to another proximately caused by negligence, even if the bystander was not in the zone of physical danger, if five elements are met: (1) the bystander was near the scene of the accident; (2) the distress resulted from direct emotional impact from sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident; (3) the bystander and victim were husband and wife or related within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity; (4) a reasonable person in the bystander's position would believe, and the bystander did believe, that the direct victim would be seriously injured or killed; and (5) the bystander's emotional distress was serious. Compensable distress should ordinarily be accompanied by physical manifestations, and "serious injury" is informed by the statutory definition adopted from Iowa Code section 702.18.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In Cedar Rapids, Nina Flores stood on the sidewalk outside a grocery store while her husband, Mateo Flores, was in the crosswalk. A delivery van negligently struck Mateo, and Nina watched the impact from about fifteen feet away. Nina was never herself at risk of being hit, but she later developed severe insomnia, vomiting, and recurring dizziness.

If Nina sues the van driver for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a bystander, which is the strongest argument that her claim should survive?

Explanation. The majority rejected the zone-of-physical-danger requirement as too harsh and artificial. A bystander may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress without being personally endangered if the plaintiff was near the scene, contemporaneously perceived the accident, had the required close relationship, reasonably believed and actually believed the victim would be seriously injured or killed, and suffered serious distress. (Derived from Barnhill v. Davis (n.d.).)