Behrens v. Pelletier

Supreme Court of the United States · 1996 · Federal Courts

Federal CourtsAppellate JurisdictionQualified ImmunityCollateral Order Doctrine28 U.S.C. § 1291qualified immunitycollateral order doctrineinterlocutory appeal

Facts

Respondent sued petitioner, a federal regulatory official, asserting Bivens claims arising from petitioner's actions affecting respondent's employment and reputation in the savings and loan industry. Petitioner first moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity; the District Court left part of the Bivens case pending and denied summary judgment as premature, and petitioner took an interlocutory appeal. After remand and discovery, the District Court reinstated additional claims and then denied petitioner's later summary judgment motion on qualified-immunity grounds, stating only that material issues of fact remained. Petitioner again appealed, and the court of appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue

Does a defendant who has already taken an interlocutory appeal from denial of qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to take a second interlocutory appeal after denial of summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds? Also, does the District Court's reference to remaining factual disputes make the second appeal unavailable under Johnson v. Jones?

Rule

An order denying qualified immunity is immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to the extent it turns on an issue of law, whether the denial occurs at the motion-to-dismiss stage or the summary-judgment stage. A prior interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal does not eliminate appellate jurisdiction over a later appeal from denial of summary judgment, because the two rulings are separate final collateral orders and the legal inquiry may differ at each stage. Johnson v. Jones bars immediate appeal only of determinations of evidentiary sufficiency, not appeals presenting abstract legal questions such as whether the conduct assumed by the district court violated clearly established law.

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Nina Torres, a federal workplace inspector in Phoenix, is sued for damages for allegedly retaliating against a contractor in violation of clearly established constitutional rights. The district court denies her Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on qualified immunity, and the court of appeals affirms. After discovery, the district court denies her summary-judgment motion on qualified immunity, even though Torres argues that, taking the plaintiff's version of the facts as true, her conduct was objectively legally reasonable.

May Torres take an immediate second interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291?

Explanation. A defendant may pursue more than one interlocutory appeal from denials of qualified immunity at different pretrial stages. The denial of dismissal and the later denial of summary judgment are separate collateral orders, and each is immediately appealable under § 1291 to the extent it turns on an issue of law. The majority rejected a one-appeal rule.