Crawford-El v. Britton

Supreme Court of the United States · 1998 · Federal Courts

Federal CourtsSection 1983Qualified ImmunityFirst Amendment RetaliationCivil Procedurequalified immunityaffirmative defenseobjective standard

Facts

Petitioner was a life prisoner in the District of Columbia system who had filed lawsuits, helped other inmates with legal matters, and spoken to reporters about prison conditions. After a series of prison transfers, three boxes containing his belongings and legal materials were received by the District of Columbia Department of Corrections, and respondent asked petitioner's brother-in-law to pick them up instead of sending them directly to petitioner's next prison. The boxes were later shipped to petitioner by his mother at his expense, and he was initially denied permission to receive them because they had been sent outside official prison channels; he recovered them months later. Petitioner alleged respondent deliberately misdirected the boxes to punish him for exercising First Amendment rights, while respondent denied retaliatory motive and said she acted to ensure prompt and safe delivery.

Issue

May a federal court of appeals require plaintiffs in constitutional tort cases that depend on proof of improper motive to produce clear and convincing evidence of that motive in order to survive summary judgment or prevail at trial? More specifically, does Harlow v. Fitzgerald justify altering the plaintiff's burden of proof in such cases to protect public officials from discovery and trial burdens?

Rule

Harlow's objective qualified-immunity standard concerns only the affirmative defense of immunity and does not alter the plaintiff's burden of proving a constitutional violation. Courts may not impose a heightened clear-and-convincing burden of proof on plaintiffs to establish unconstitutional motive in § 1983 or similar constitutional tort actions absent statutory, rule-based, or historical common-law support. Instead, district courts should protect officials through ordinary case-management tools, including requiring specific nonconclusory factual allegations, deciding qualified immunity early, tailoring discovery, and using summary judgment to screen insubstantial claims.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Cleveland, Maya Torres sued a city licensing inspector under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the inspector delayed her permit application in retaliation for her public criticism at city council meetings. The inspector asserted qualified immunity, and the district court required Maya to prove retaliatory motive by clear and convincing evidence to survive summary judgment because motive-based suits are especially burdensome for officials.

Was the district court correct to impose that burden?

Explanation. The majority held that Harlow's objective qualified-immunity rule governs the immunity defense, not the plaintiff's burden to prove the constitutional violation. Courts may not impose a judicially created clear-and-convincing burden for unconstitutional motive absent support in statute, rules, or common-law tradition. The proper response is use of ordinary tools such as tailored discovery, early immunity rulings, and ordinary summary-judgment standards.