Belli v. Orlando Daily Newspapers, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 1967 · Torts

389 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1967)

Updated July 23, 2026

TortsDefamationLibelSlanderConspiracyFirst Amendmentlibel per seslander per se

Facts

An Orlando attorney, Leon Handley, told columnist Jean Yothers a story that the Florida Bar had agreed to pay only the hotel expenses for Melvin Belli and his wife when Belli appeared on a convention panel, and that after they left, clothing purchases had been charged to the hotel bill. The derogatory part of that story was admittedly false. Yothers then published a gossip-column item stating that the Bellis charged hundreds of dollars in clothing to their hotel rooms and that the Florida Bar "had been taken" because "that was the plan." Belli sued the columnist, newspaper, editor, and Handley for libel, slander, and conspiracy, but did not plead extrinsic facts or special damages.

Issue

Whether the complaint stated claims for libel per se, slander per se, and conspiracy when the publication and oral statement were capable of a defamatory meaning on their face. Also, whether dismissal was proper on the theory that only the court, and not the jury, determines whether such statements are defamatory per se, and whether the New York Times public-figure privilege defeated the complaint at the pleading stage.

Rule

In defamation cases, the court first determines whether the language is capable of bearing a particular meaning and whether that meaning is defamatory; if the language is capable of both defamatory and nondefamatory meanings, the jury determines whether recipients understood it in the defamatory sense under the common-mind test. Under Florida law, statements may be actionable per se when, on their face and without extrinsic facts, they impute conduct incompatible with one's profession or expose a person to distrust, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy; slander per se likewise includes statements holding another up to scorn, contempt, and ridicule. A complaint alleging actual malice satisfies pleading requirements because malice may be averred generally under Rule 9(b), and whether the New York Times privilege applies requires threshold factual determination by the trial court as to public-figure status and whether the publication concerns the plaintiff's public conduct or a matter of legitimate and substantial public interest.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Tampa, a neighborhood paper ran a column saying that architect Nora Kim persuaded a civic festival to cover only her lodging, then "worked it" so custom furniture for her condo was billed to the festival's hotel account. Nora sued for libel in federal court under Florida law and did not plead extrinsic facts or special damages.

At the motion-to-dismiss stage, which is the best disposition?

Explanation. Under the majority opinion, the court first determines whether the communication is capable of a particular meaning and whether that meaning is defamatory. If the language is capable of both defamatory and nondefamatory meanings, the jury decides whether recipients understood it in the defamatory sense under the common-mind test. Because Nora did not plead extrinsic facts or special damages, the issue is whether the article is defamatory on its face; a statement implying she tricked an organization into paying personal expenses is capable of defamatory meaning.