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Bush v. Vera

Supreme Court of the United States · 1996 · Constitutional Law

Constitutional LawEqual ProtectionRacial GerrymanderingVoting Rights Actracial gerrymanderingstrict scrutinypredominant factortraditional districting principles

Facts

Texas gained three congressional seats after the 1990 census and, seeking to comply with the Voting Rights Act, created District 30 as a majority-African-American district in Dallas County, District 29 as a majority-Hispanic district in Harris County, and reconfigured adjacent District 18 as a majority-African-American district. The legislature used a computer program with block-by-block racial data, and the district court found that the challenged districts were highly irregular and that district lines tracked racial data with near-perfect correlation. The record also showed that the State was committed from the outset to creating majority-minority districts, though incumbency protection also influenced line drawing. Plaintiffs residing in Districts 18, 29, and 30 challenged those districts as racial gerrymanders under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Issue

Whether Texas's Districts 18, 29, and 30 were subject to strict scrutiny as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders because race predominated over traditional districting principles, and if so, whether those districts were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest under the Voting Rights Act or remedial justifications. A threshold issue was whether the plaintiffs had standing to challenge those districts.

Rule

In redistricting cases, strict scrutiny applies only when race is the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision and traditional race-neutral districting principles are subordinated to racial considerations. Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because the legislature was conscious of race or intentionally created a majority-minority district. Even assuming compliance with VRA § 2 can be a compelling state interest, a district drawn to satisfy § 2 must not subordinate traditional districting principles to race substantially more than is reasonably necessary; and VRA § 5 nonretrogression does not justify substantial augmentation of minority population beyond what is reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

Lena Ortiz lives in a congressional district centered in Tucson, Arizona. She sues to challenge a neighboring district in Phoenix as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, alleging only that the statewide map relied too heavily on race and affected politics across Arizona.

Does Lena have standing to challenge the Phoenix district?

Explanation. A voter who resides in the challenged racially gerrymandered district has standing because the legislature's alleged racial classification applies to that voter. But a voter who lives elsewhere lacks standing absent specific facts showing personal subjection to racial classification. Mere objection to the statewide map or its political effects is not enough.