Bush-Quayle '92 Primary Committee, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit · 1997 · Administrative Law

Administrative LawChevron deferencearbitrary and capricious reviewagency precedentreasoned explanationFECqualified campaign expensesstanding

Facts

Under the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, the Bush-Quayle '92 Primary Committee received $10,668,521 in public matching funds during the 1992 primary campaign, and after the nomination the Bush-Quayle '92 General Committee received general-election public funds. In its audit, the FEC concluded that several expenditures made before August 20, 1992, including polling, mailings, list rental, office space, and equipment, benefited the general election and therefore were not fully qualified primary campaign expenses. Rather than allocating those expenses entirely to the General Committee as the staff had recommended, the Commission treated them as mixed-purpose expenditures and assigned half to the Primary Committee and half to the General Committee. The Commission then required the Primary Committee to repay $323,882 and found that the General Committee had exceeded its expenditure limit, while declining to require further payment from the General or Compliance Committees.

Issue

Whether the FEC could interpret the phrase "in connection with" a campaign for nomination to require that an expenditure be primarily related to the primary campaign, and, if so, whether the Commission nonetheless acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to explain its different treatment of similar mixed-purpose expenditures in the earlier Reagan-Bush audit.

Rule

Where the statutory and regulatory phrase "in connection with" is ambiguous, the FEC may reasonably interpret it to require that a qualified primary campaign expense be primarily related to the campaign for nomination. But even a permissible agency interpretation cannot stand if the agency departs from prior precedent without supplying a reasoned analysis showing that the prior approach is being deliberately changed or that the earlier case is meaningfully distinguishable.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

The Federal Campaign Review Board audited a presidential campaign in Phoenix and formally ordered only the nomination committee to repay public funds. But the same determination also stated that the campaign's general-election committee had exceeded its spending cap by $210,000 and that its compliance affiliate in Arlington would need to transfer funds to cure the overage. The general-election committee and compliance affiliate petition for review along with the nomination committee.

Do the general-election committee and compliance affiliate most likely have Article III standing to seek review?

Explanation. Standing exists where the petitioners show injury in fact, traceability, and redressability. Even if the agency formally orders repayment only from one committee, related committees have standing when the agency's findings effectively mean they exceeded legal limits and must raise or transfer funds to cure the problem. Those implicit repayment-related obligations are sufficiently concrete injuries.