Home › Case briefs › Constitutional Law

California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1985 · Constitutional Law

Constitutional LawTitle VIIPregnancy Discrimination ActFederal PreemptionEmployment DiscriminationTitle VIIPDApregnancy disability leave

Facts

California law required employers covered by Title VII to allow female employees disabled by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions to take up to four months of leave. Cal Fed maintained a facially gender-neutral disability leave policy, but it did not provide the statutorily required four-month pregnancy disability leave. Employee Lillian Garland took a four-month pregnancy disability leave in 1982, but Cal Fed denied her request for reinstatement to the same or a similar job and she did not return until several months later. The California Department of Fair Employment and Housing then served Cal Fed with a complaint alleging violation of section 12945(b)(2).

Issue

Does Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, preempt a California statute requiring employers to provide up to four months of pregnancy disability leave and reinstatement to the same or a similar job? More specifically, does that statute require or permit conduct that is unlawful under, or inconsistent with, Title VII?

Rule

Title VII's preemption of state antidiscrimination law is narrow: state law is displaced only if it requires or permits an employment practice that is unlawful under Title VII or is inconsistent with Title VII's purposes. Under the PDA, pregnancy must not be treated less favorably than other medical conditions, and the Act establishes a minimum level of protection for pregnancy-related conditions rather than forbidding states from providing greater pregnancy disability benefits. Equality under the PDA is measured by employment opportunity and by comparison to actual need, not by requiring identical benefits regardless of biological differences.

🔒

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

The court's holding and reasoning
Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case

Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

Oregon enacts a statute requiring employers covered by Title VII to provide up to ten weeks of leave for employees disabled by pregnancy and to restore them to the same or a comparable position. Pine Terrace Lending, a fictional mortgage company in Portland, offers all employees a facially neutral disability policy but no guaranteed pregnancy-specific leave, and it sues claiming federal law preempts the Oregon statute because men can never qualify for that leave.

How should a court rule on the preemption claim under the majority's approach?

Explanation. The majority described Title VII preemption as narrow. State law survives unless it requires or permits an unlawful employment practice under Title VII or is inconsistent with Title VII's purposes. A pregnancy-disability leave guarantee is permissible because the PDA sets a floor for pregnancy protection and does not require blindness to pregnancy. Equality is measured by employment opportunity and actual need, not identical treatment despite biological differences. (Derived from California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra (n.d.).)