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Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County

Supreme Court of the United States · 1987 · Constitutional Law
Constitutional LawTitle VIIaffirmative actionemployment discriminationsex discriminationTitle VIIaffirmative action plansex as one factor

Facts

The Santa Clara County Transportation Agency adopted an affirmative action plan authorizing consideration of sex as one factor in promotions for traditionally segregated job classifications in which women were significantly underrepresented. Women made up 36.4% of the area labor market but only 22.4% of Agency employees, and none of the 238 Skilled Craft Worker positions was held by a woman. When a road dispatcher vacancy arose, both Johnson and Joyce were qualified, and the Agency Director selected Joyce after considering qualifications, interview scores, background, and affirmative action concerns. The plan set no aside of positions for women, and at the time the Agency had never employed a woman as a road dispatcher and employed no women in any Skilled Craft position.

Issue

Whether the Agency violated Title VII by taking Joyce's sex into account in promoting her to road dispatcher pursuant to its affirmative action plan. More specifically, the question was whether the plan and the promotion decision were permissible under Title VII's standards for voluntary affirmative action.

Rule

Under Title VII, an employer may voluntarily take sex or race into account as one factor in employment decisions when acting under an affirmative action plan aimed at eliminating a manifest imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories. Such a plan is lawful if it does not unnecessarily trammel the rights of male or nonminority employees, does not create an absolute bar to their advancement, and is a temporary, flexible effort to attain rather than maintain balance. For jobs requiring special training, underrepresentation should be assessed by comparison to those in the labor force who possess the relevant qualifications.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
Lakeview Public Works in Columbus, Ohio adopted a written promotion plan allowing supervisors to consider sex as one factor when filling positions in job categories where women were significantly underrepresented. After a qualified male applicant, Evan Price, was passed over for a fleet-operations supervisor promotion in favor of a qualified female applicant, Mara Singh, the department stated that it acted under the plan and considered experience, interview performance, and affirmative action concerns.

In Evan's Title VII suit, who bears the burden of proving whether the plan is invalid once the department articulates the plan as the reason sex was considered?

Explanation. Once the employer articulates an affirmative action plan as the rationale for taking sex into account, the plan provides a nondiscriminatory justification within the McDonnell Douglas framework, and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the plan is invalid or pretextual. The majority rejected treating reliance on the plan as an affirmative defense that the employer must prove.