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Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia

Supreme Court of the United States · 2020 · Constitutional Law

Title VIIEmployment DiscriminationStatutory InterpretationSex DiscriminationTitle VIIbecause of sexbut-for causationindividual-focused discrimination

Facts

Each case involved an employer allegedly firing a long-time employee shortly after the employee revealed that he or she was homosexual or transgender, and allegedly for no reason other than that status. Gerald Bostock was fired by Clayton County after participating in a gay recreational softball league and after disparaging comments about his sexual orientation. Donald Zarda, a skydiving instructor, was fired days after mentioning he was gay. Aimee Stephens, who had been employed by a funeral home while presenting as male, informed her employer that she would live and work full-time as a woman and was then fired.

Issue

Whether an employer who fires an individual merely for being homosexual or transgender violates Title VII's prohibition on discharging an individual because of that individual's sex. More specifically, does discrimination based on homosexuality or transgender status necessarily constitute discrimination because of sex under Title VII?

Rule

An employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part on sex. If changing the employee's sex would have yielded a different employment outcome, sex is a but-for cause of the discharge, and Title VII is violated even if other factors also contributed and even if the employer treats men and women comparably as groups.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

Riverview Design Studio in Denver fires Noah Price after he tells his supervisor that he is engaged to a man. The firm admits it would not have fired an otherwise identical employee named Nina Price for being engaged to a man, but says the real problem was Noah's same-sex relationship, not his sex.

Assuming Noah proves those facts, is the discharge because of sex under Title VII?

Explanation. The majority's rule is that an employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual and sex is one but-for cause of the decision. If an employee attracted to men is fired when male but would be retained if female, the employer necessarily treats that individual differently because of sex. It does not matter that sexual orientation is also involved or that sex is not the sole cause. (Derived from Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia (2020).)