Home › Case briefs › Civil Procedure

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis

Supreme Court of the United States · 1996 · Civil Procedure

Civil ProcedureRemovalDiversity JurisdictionRemanddiversity jurisdictioncomplete diversityremovalremand

Facts

Lewis, a Kentucky citizen, sued Caterpillar, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois, and Whayne Supply, a Kentucky corporation, in Kentucky state court on state-law personal injury claims. Liberty Mutual, a Massachusetts corporation, intervened as a plaintiff and asserted subrogation claims against both defendants. Caterpillar removed the case after Lewis settled his own claims against Whayne Supply, but before Liberty Mutual settled its subrogation claim against Whayne Supply, so complete diversity did not exist at removal. Lewis timely moved to remand, but the district court denied the motion; later, Liberty Mutual settled with Whayne Supply, Whayne Supply was dismissed, complete diversity existed before trial, and the case proceeded to judgment for Caterpillar.

Issue

When a diversity case is removed before complete diversity exists and the plaintiff timely moves to remand, must a final federal judgment be vacated because removal was improper, even though the nondiverse defendant was dismissed before trial and complete diversity existed when judgment was entered?

Rule

An erroneous denial of a timely motion to remand a diversity case removed before complete diversity exists is not fatal to the ensuing adjudication if, by the time judgment is entered, complete diversity and therefore federal subject-matter jurisdiction exist. A statutory defect in removal does not require vacatur of a final judgment when the jurisdictional defect has been cured before trial and judgment.

🔒

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

The court's holding and reasoning
Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case

Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

Nina Ortega, a citizen of New Mexico, sued Blue Mesa Lifts, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Colorado, and Rafael Dunn, a New Mexico citizen, in New Mexico state court on state-law negligence claims. Blue Mesa removed on diversity grounds while Dunn still faced an unresolved cross-claim by a diverse intervening insurer, and Nina timely moved to remand; the district court denied remand, Dunn was dismissed before trial, and the case proceeded to verdict for Blue Mesa.

On Nina's appeal from the final judgment, what is the strongest argument for affirming the judgment?

Explanation. The majority drew a distinction between an antecedent statutory flaw in removal and the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction at the time of judgment. If complete diversity and thus federal jurisdiction exist when judgment is entered, an erroneous failure to remand does not require vacatur of the final judgment, even though removal was improper when filed.