Chase v. State

Supreme Court of North Dakota · 2024 · Criminal Law

Criminal LawPostconviction ReliefNewly Discovered EvidenceJury Misconductpostconviction reliefnewly discovered evidenceRule 33affirmative defenses

Facts

Chase was convicted in 2014 of gross sexual imposition. In his amended postconviction application, he claimed newly discovered evidence in the form of a medical record created eight days after the alleged incident and an alleged improper communication to jurors during deliberations that they could not return a hung jury. At the evidentiary hearing, Chase conceded his trial attorney had received the medical record before trial and that its nonuse had already been discussed in earlier postconviction proceedings. On the jury-contact claim, one juror testified that a uniformed person entered the jury room and said the jury had to reach a unanimous decision, but she could not identify the person, no other juror corroborated the event, and two law enforcement officers testified they did not enter the jury room.

Issue

Whether the district court properly denied postconviction relief where the State had not pleaded res judicata or the statute of limitations, where the claimed medical record was already known before trial, and where the district court found the juror's testimony about improper jury contact not credible. Also, whether the Remmer presumption of prejudice applied without a credible threshold showing that improper contact actually occurred.

Rule

In a postconviction proceeding under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(1)(e), a claim based on evidence not previously presented and heard is evaluated under the same standard as a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence under N.D.R.Crim.P. 33. To prevail, the defendant must show: (1) the evidence was discovered after trial, (2) the failure to learn of it at trial was not due to lack of diligence, (3) it is material to the trial issues, and (4) its weight and quality would likely result in acquittal. Res judicata and the postconviction time bar are affirmative defenses waived if not pleaded, and the Remmer presumption of prejudice applies only after the defendant first establishes that improper juror contact actually occurred.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In a postconviction proceeding in Fargo, Devin Mercer alleged newly discovered evidence and requested a new trial. The State's answer denied the allegations on the merits but did not mention res judicata or any filing deadline; after the evidentiary hearing, the judge denied relief solely because the claim had been raised before and was untimely.

What is the best analysis of the judge's ruling?

Explanation. The majority held that both res judicata and the postconviction time bar are affirmative defenses that are waived if not raised in the State's responsive pleading. A district court therefore errs by invoking those grounds sua sponte. The applicant still bears the burden on the merits, but the court cannot deny relief on waived affirmative defenses. (Derived from Chase v. State (n.d.).)