Durham v. State

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware · 2023 · Criminal Law

Criminal LawPostconviction ReliefRule 61 Procedural BarsActual InnocenceRule 61postconviction reliefsuccessive motionactual innocence

Facts

A jury convicted Durham in 2003 of attempted first-degree robbery and related offenses arising from a home invasion, and the Superior Court sentenced him to life imprisonment after declaring him a habitual offender. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and the denial of his first postconviction motion was also affirmed. In June 2022, Durham filed a motion to stay and a third Rule 61 motion, repeatedly invoking Purnell v. State but not explaining how it applied to his case. On appeal, he asserted that he intended later to develop claims based on an undisclosed plea offer, an undisclosed agreement with a State witness and co-defendant who later admitted perjury, and the victim's admission that police coerced him to identify Durham.

Issue

Whether the Superior Court erred in denying Durham's third Rule 61 motion as procedurally barred without allowing amendment or a stay, where Durham invoked Purnell but did not plead with particularity facts satisfying Rule 61(d)(2). Also, whether the Superior Court erred in applying the current version of Rule 61 rather than the pre-June 2014 version.

Rule

Under Rule 61(d)(2), a second or subsequent postconviction motion must be summarily dismissed unless a trial-convicted movant pleads with particularity either new evidence creating a strong inference that he is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges, or a retroactive new rule of constitutional law that applies to his case and renders the conviction or death sentence invalid. Rule 61(i)(5) lifts the procedural bars in Rule 61(i)(1)-(4) only if the movant satisfies Rule 61(d)(2)(i) or (ii). Evidence that is merely cumulative or impeaching does not satisfy the actual-innocence standard, and innocence of the acts underlying the charges requires more than innocence of intent; it requires new evidence that someone other than the movant committed the crime. The version of Rule 61 in effect when the Rule 61 motion is filed governs that motion.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Wilmington, Jordan Mercer was convicted after trial of armed burglary. Fifteen years later, he filed a third postconviction motion stating only that a recent Delaware decision on actual innocence "controls" his case and that he plans to explain the details later if the court pauses the case.

How should the court rule on Jordan's third postconviction motion?

Explanation. A second or subsequent postconviction motion must be summarily dismissed unless the trial-convicted movant pleads with particularity either new evidence creating a strong inference of actual innocence in fact of the acts underlying the charges or a retroactive new rule of constitutional law that invalidates the conviction. Merely invoking a favorable case and saying more facts will come later is insufficient. The court addresses Rule 61's procedural requirements first, and unsupported placeholder allegations do not satisfy them. (Derived from Durham v. State (n.d.).)