City of Arlington v. FCC

Supreme Court of the United States · 2013 · Administrative Law

569 U.S. 290 (2013)

Updated August 1, 2026

Administrative Lawdeference to jurisdictional questionsChevron deferenceChevronagency jurisdictionstatutory ambiguitydelegated authorityrulemaking authority

Facts

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 limits state and local authority over wireless siting decisions and requires governments to act on siting applications within a reasonable period of time. Section 201(b) of the Communications Act authorizes the FCC to prescribe rules and regulations necessary in the public interest to carry out the Act's provisions. In response to a petition from CTIA, the FCC issued a declaratory ruling concluding that a reasonable period of time is presumptively 90 days for collocation applications and 150 days for other applications. Petitioning cities argued the FCC lacked authority to interpret Section 332(c)(7)(B) because the saving clause and judicial-review provision showed Congress meant to withhold such interpretive authority from the FCC.

Issue

Whether a court must apply Chevron deference to an agency's interpretation of a statutory ambiguity concerning the scope of the agency's statutory authority, i.e., its jurisdiction. More specifically, whether Chevron applies to the FCC's determination that it had authority to interpret Section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).

Rule

When an agency interprets a statute it administers, Chevron applies to statutory ambiguities, including ambiguities concerning the scope of the agency's regulatory authority. There is no separate category of 'jurisdictional' agency interpretations exempt from Chevron; the relevant question is whether the statutory text clearly forecloses the agency's assertion of authority, and if not, whether the agency's interpretation is permissible. Chevron's preconditions are satisfied where Congress has unambiguously vested the agency with general authority to administer the statute through rulemaking or adjudication and the interpretation was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

Congress creates the Coastal Freight Board and authorizes it to issue rules and adjudications necessary to carry out the National Shipping Act. The Act bars "ocean carriers" from imposing "unreasonable access conditions" at cargo terminals, and the Board adopts a rule interpreting "ocean carriers" to include hybrid barge-to-port operators. A terminal owner in Baltimore argues that courts must decide that issue de novo because it goes to the Board's jurisdiction.

How should a reviewing court analyze the Board's interpretation?

Explanation. The majority rejected any special category of 'jurisdictional' interpretations exempt from Chevron. The question is whether the statutory text forecloses the agency's assertion of authority; if not, and the agency is interpreting a statute it administers pursuant to delegated rulemaking or adjudicative authority, Chevron applies.