National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services

Supreme Court of the United States · 2005 · Administrative Law

545 U.S. 967 (2005)

Updated August 1, 2026

Administrative Lawagency interpretation vs. precedentChevron deferencetelecommunications service classificationChevron step oneChevron step twostare decisisagency precedent conflict

Facts

The Communications Act subjects providers of "telecommunications service" to mandatory common-carrier regulation under Title II, while "information service" providers are not subject to that mandatory regime. In a 2002 Declaratory Ruling, the FCC concluded that cable companies offering broadband Internet access provide a single, integrated information service and do not offer telecommunications service to end users. The FCC reasoned that from the consumer's perspective the high-speed transmission component is part and parcel of Internet access and is always used in connection with information-processing capabilities such as web browsing, e-mail, DNS, and caching. The Ninth Circuit held that its earlier Portland decision foreclosed the FCC's contrary interpretation.

Issue

Whether the FCC's interpretation that cable modem service is not a "telecommunications service" is entitled to Chevron deference and is a lawful construction of the Communications Act. Also, whether a prior judicial interpretation bars a contrary agency interpretation when the prior court decision did not hold the statute unambiguous.

Rule

When Congress has delegated authority to an agency to administer a statute, courts apply Chevron to the agency's interpretation if the statute is ambiguous and the agency's reading is reasonable. A prior judicial construction of a statute displaces a contrary agency interpretation otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only when the prior court decision held that the statute's unambiguous terms required that construction and left no gap for agency discretion. Agency inconsistency does not defeat Chevron; unexplained inconsistency is instead considered under the APA's arbitrary-and-capricious standard.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

The Federal Transit Communications Board administers a federal transit statute and, after notice-and-comment rulemaking, interprets the term "passenger routing service" to exclude a bundled smartphone trip-planning platform. Years earlier, the Tenth Circuit had read the same term to include that platform, but the opinion said only that this was the "best reading" of the statute and did not state that the statutory text was unambiguous.

If a district court in Denver reviews the Board's new rule, which approach is most consistent with the governing doctrine?

Explanation. A prior judicial construction displaces an otherwise Chevron-eligible agency interpretation only if the prior court decision held the statute's unambiguous terms required that result, leaving no gap for agency discretion. If the earlier opinion merely adopted what it thought was the best reading, Chevron still applies to the agency's later reasonable interpretation.