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Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.

Supreme Court of the United States · 1994 · Civil Procedure
Civil ProcedureAppellate JurisdictionFinal Judgment RuleCollateral Order Doctrine28 U.S.C. § 1291collateral orderfinal judgmentsettlement agreement

Facts

Desktop Direct sued Digital for unlawful use of the trade name "Desktop Direct." The parties then reached a confidential settlement under which Digital would pay Desktop for the right to use the trade name and trademark, Desktop would waive damages, and the suit would be dismissed; Desktop filed a notice of dismissal that same day. Months later, Desktop moved to vacate the dismissal and rescind the settlement, alleging that Digital had misrepresented material facts during settlement negotiations. The District Court granted the motion, concluding that a factfinder could determine Digital failed to disclose material facts, and Digital sought immediate appellate review of that order.

Issue

Whether a district court order vacating a dismissal entered pursuant to a settlement agreement, and thereby denying effect to the settlement before resolution of the underlying merits, is immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as a collateral order. More specifically, the question was whether a claimed contractual "right not to stand trial" created by settlement is sufficiently important and effectively unreviewable after final judgment to justify collateral-order review.

Rule

An order refusing to enforce a settlement agreement claimed to shelter a party from suit altogether is not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as a collateral order. The collateral order doctrine remains narrow and applies only to a small class of conclusive orders resolving important questions separate from the merits that would be effectively unreviewable after final judgment; the mere characterization of a private contractual interest as a "right not to stand trial" does not satisfy that standard.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In federal court in Denver, Nora Blake sued Summit Valley Nutrition, LLC for unfair competition. The parties signed a settlement requiring Nora to dismiss the case and never sue again on the dispute, but six months later the district court vacated the dismissal after finding evidence that Summit Valley may have concealed material facts during negotiations.

Summit Valley files an immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, arguing the settlement gave it a contractual right not to stand trial. Is the order immediately appealable as a collateral order?

Explanation. No. The majority held that an order refusing to enforce a settlement agreement claimed to bar suit altogether is not immediately appealable under § 1291 as a collateral order. A privately negotiated settlement right does not become immediately appealable merely because it is labeled a right not to stand trial. The Court rejected using settlement policy or the contractual label alone to expand the narrow collateral order doctrine. (Derived from Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc. (1994).)