Duncan v. Walker

Supreme Court of the United States · 2001 · Federal Courts

Federal CourtsHabeas CorpusAEDPAStatutory InterpretationAEDPA28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)tollingfederal habeas

Facts

Walker was convicted of robbery in New York state court, and his last conviction became final in April 1996, before AEDPA's effective date. On April 10, 1996, he filed in federal district court a single document containing both a § 1983 complaint and a § 2254 habeas petition; the district court dismissed the habeas petition without prejudice on July 9, 1996, because it was not apparent that he had exhausted available state remedies. Walker did not return to state court after that dismissal. On May 20, 1997, he filed another federal habeas petition, and the timeliness of that petition depended on whether the first federal habeas petition tolled the one-year limitation period under § 2244(d)(2).

Issue

Does a federal habeas corpus petition count as an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral review" under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), so that its pendency tolls AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations?

Rule

A federal habeas petition is not an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral review" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Therefore, AEDPA's one-year limitations period is tolled only while a properly filed state post-conviction or other state collateral review application is pending, not while a federal habeas petition is pending.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

After his Ohio burglary conviction became final, Marcus Hale waited eight months and then filed a federal habeas petition in federal court in Cleveland. Four months later, the petition was dismissed without prejudice because several claims had not been exhausted in state court. Marcus filed a new federal habeas petition six weeks after the dismissal and argues the limitations period was tolled while the first federal petition was pending.

Under the governing rule, which is the strongest response to Marcus's tolling argument?

Explanation. Section 2244(d)(2) tolls time only during the pendency of a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other State collateral review. The majority held that the word "State" modifies the entire phrase, so a federal habeas petition does not trigger statutory tolling, even if it was timely filed and later dismissed without prejudice.