Gonzalez v. Crosby
Facts
Gonzalez pleaded guilty in Florida state court and later filed a federal habeas petition under § 2254 alleging that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. The District Court dismissed that petition as barred by AEDPA's statute of limitations, concluding that a pending state postconviction motion did not toll the limitations period because it was not "properly filed." After the Supreme Court decided Artuz v. Bennett, Gonzalez filed a pro se Rule 60(b)(6) motion contending that the federal court's statute-of-limitations ruling was incorrect. His motion attacked only the federal court's procedural ruling and did not add any new ground for relief from his conviction.
Issue
Whether, in a § 2254 habeas case, a Rule 60(b) motion is subject to AEDPA's restrictions on second or successive habeas petitions. More specifically, whether a Rule 60(b)(6) motion that challenges only the federal court's prior statute-of-limitations ruling must be treated as a successive habeas application under § 2244(b).
Rule
For purposes of AEDPA, a filing is treated as a second or successive habeas application when it contains a "claim," meaning an asserted federal basis for relief from the state court judgment of conviction. A Rule 60(b) motion presents such a claim if it seeks to add a new ground for relief or attacks the federal court's prior merits resolution of a habeas claim; it is not successive when it attacks only a defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings, such as a prior ruling that precluded a merits determination. Even when not successive, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances.
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