Edmond v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States · 1997 · Administrative Law
520 U.S. 651 (1997)
Updated
Administrative LawAppointments Clauseinferior officersprincipal officersSecretary of TransportationCoast Guard Court of Criminal AppealsArticle 6649 U.S.C. § 323(a)

Facts

The Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals is an intermediate military appellate court whose decisions are subject to review by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Two civilian judges on that court, Chief Judge Baum and Judge Bridgman, had initially been assigned by the Department of Transportation's General Counsel, but after questions arose under Weiss, the Secretary of Transportation issued a memorandum adopting those assignments as judicial appointments of his own on January 15, 1993. Each petitioner had a court-martial conviction affirmed after that date by panels including Baum and, in some cases, Bridgman. Petitioners challenged those post-1993 affirmances on the ground that the Secretary lacked statutory authority to appoint the judges and that the judges were principal officers who required presidential appointment with Senate confirmation.

Issue

Did Congress authorize the Secretary of Transportation under 49 U.S.C. § 323(a) to appoint civilian judges of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals? If so, are those judges inferior officers, so that their appointment by a department head complies with the Appointments Clause?

Rule

Article 66(a) of the UCMJ concerns the assignment of appellate military judges, not their appointment. Under 49 U.S.C. § 323(a), the Secretary of Transportation may appoint officers of the Department of Transportation, including judges of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals. For Appointments Clause purposes, inferior officers are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
The Department of Public Works houses the National Infrastructure Review Board, an internal appellate body. A federal statute says the agency's Litigation Director may "assign" licensed attorneys, whether civil servants or private citizens, to sit on the Board, but another statute gives the Secretary of Public Works power to appoint officers and employees of the department.

Priya Desai, whose permit penalty was affirmed by a panel including a civilian attorney assigned by the Litigation Director, argues the panel was invalid because the assignment statute itself made the Litigation Director the appointing authority. Which is the strongest response?

Explanation. The majority distinguished assignment from appointment. A statute speaking in terms of who may be "assigned" to serve addresses deployment to a duty, not Appointments Clause appointment authority. Where a department-head statute authorizes appointment of departmental officers, that statute can supply the appointment power, while the assignment statute does not.