Bowsher v. Synar

Supreme Court of the United States · 1986 · Administrative Law

478 U.S. 714 (1986)

Updated August 1, 2026

Administrative Lawcongressional removal powerseparation of powersComptroller GeneralGramm-Rudman-Hollings Actremoval powerexecutive functionsCongressional control

Facts

The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 sought to reduce federal deficits through automatic across-the-board spending cuts if projected deficits exceeded statutory targets. Under the Act, the Directors of OMB and CBO would submit deficit estimates and reduction calculations to the Comptroller General, who would review them and report conclusions to the President. The President was then required to issue a sequestration order implementing the reductions specified by the Comptroller General and could not modify the Comptroller General's determinations. The Comptroller General was appointed by the President with Senate confirmation but was removable by Congress through joint resolution for causes including inefficiency, neglect of duty, and malfeasance.

Issue

Whether Congress's assignment of deficit-reduction functions under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 to the Comptroller General violates separation of powers because the Comptroller General is removable by Congress. Also, whether the invalid provisions should be remedied by striking the Act's reporting provisions rather than the older statutory removal provisions governing the Comptroller General.

Rule

Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment. Because Congress may not itself execute the laws, it also may not entrust executive powers to an officer under its control through congressional removal authority.

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Congress creates the Federal Water Allocation Auditor, appointed by the President with Senate confirmation. Under a drought statute, the Auditor determines regional water cutbacks after reviewing agency submissions, and the Secretary of Interior must implement the Auditor's numbers exactly. The statute allows Congress to remove the Auditor by joint resolution for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance.

If ranchers in Colorado challenge the arrangement on separation-of-powers grounds, what is the strongest argument that the arrangement is unconstitutional?

Explanation. The controlling rule is that Congress cannot reserve for itself removal authority, other than impeachment, over an officer charged with executing the laws. Here, the Auditor interprets the statute, assesses facts, and makes binding determinations the Executive must carry out unchanged, so the duties are executive. Because Congress retains removal by joint resolution on broad grounds, Congress has impermissible control over execution of the law.