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INS v. Chadha

Supreme Court of the United States · 1983 · Constitutional Law

separation of powerslegislative vetobicameralismpresentmentArticle Ibicameralismpresentmentlegislative veto

Facts

Chadha, a deportable alien who had overstayed his student visa, applied for suspension of deportation under § 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Immigration Judge found that Chadha satisfied the statutory requirements and suspended his deportation, and that suspension was reported to Congress under § 244(c)(1). Under § 244(c)(2), either House could pass a resolution disapproving the suspension, and the House did so with respect to Chadha without submitting the resolution to the Senate or presenting it to the President. The House action required the Attorney General to deport Chadha, leading to a final deportation order that Chadha challenged as unconstitutional.

Issue

Whether § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorizes one House of Congress by resolution to invalidate the Executive's decision to suspend a particular alien's deportation, violates the Constitution. The case also presented threshold questions of jurisdiction, standing, severability, and justiciability.

Rule

When Congress or either House takes action that is legislative in purpose and effect, that action must conform to the single, finely wrought procedure prescribed by Article I: passage by both Houses and presentment to the President. The character of the action depends not on its label or form, but on whether it contains matter properly regarded as legislative in character and effect. Not every action by one House is subject to Article I, but legally binding action outside enumerated exceptions may not bypass bicameralism and presentment.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

Congress enacts a statute authorizing the Secretary of Energy to grant individual waivers from a federal fuel-storage requirement when strict compliance would cause severe hardship. The statute also provides that either the House or the Senate may, by simple resolution, cancel any waiver within 60 days, and the resolution is not sent to the President. After the Secretary grants a waiver to Red Mesa Heating in Denver, the House passes such a resolution.

Is the House's cancellation of the waiver constitutional?

Explanation. The controlling question is whether the challenged action is legislative in character and effect, not what Congress labels it. A one-House resolution that changes the legal rights, duties, and relations of the company and the Executive is legislative action. Under Article I, legislative action must follow the Constitution's single, finely wrought procedure: passage by both Houses and presentment to the President, unless a specific constitutional exception applies. Delegation to the Executive does not authorize Congress or one House to control the execution of law by legislative veto.