Supreme Court of the United States · 1998 · Constitutional Law
separation of powersline item vetopresentment clausestandingseparation of powersline item vetocongressional cession of powerabdication of responsibility
Facts
The statute at issue was designed to restrain persistent excessive spending. It created a mechanism that gave the President the sole ability to cancel spending measures or tax benefits affecting identifiable groups. Its practical effect was the functional equivalent of a line item veto. Although Congress enacted the statute itself, the law transferred to the President authority that altered the ordinary constitutional allocation of power.
Issue
Whether Congress may constitutionally give the President unilateral authority, functionally equivalent to a line item veto, to determine the cancellation of spending measures or tax benefits, consistent with the separation of powers embodied in the Constitution.
Rule
The Constitution's separation of powers forbids one branch from transgressing the structural limits that protect liberty, and Congress cannot validate such a transgression by voluntarily surrendering its own authority to the President. A congressional cession of power does not become constitutional merely because Congress consented to it or because a later statute could reclaim the power.
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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
Congress enacts the Targeted Revenue Savings Act in Washington, D.C. The Act provides that after signing any tax bill, the President may nullify any one industry-specific deduction within 10 days if the President concludes the deduction is fiscally unwise, and the nullification takes effect without further action by Congress. A group of vineyard owners in California challenges the law.
Under the controlling separation-of-powers reasoning, is the Act most likely constitutional?
Explanation. The majority reasoning condemns a statute that gives the President unilateral authority over spending or tax outcomes in a way functionally equivalent to a line-item veto. The problem is structural: taxation and spending may not be determined by the Executive alone without adequate control by the people's representatives in Congress. Congress's initial enactment of the procedure does not cure the constitutional defect. (Derived from Clinton v. City of New York (1998).)