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Florida v. Nixon

Supreme Court of the United States · 2004 · Criminal Procedure

Criminal ProcedureIneffective Assistance of CounselCapital DefenseSixth Amendmentineffective assistanceStricklandCroniccapital trial

Facts

Nixon was tried for a brutal murder supported by overwhelming evidence, including his detailed confession and corroborating witness and physical evidence. His lawyer, Corin, concluded guilt was not reasonably disputable and, after failed plea negotiations, decided the best chance to avoid a death sentence was to concede guilt at the guilt phase and focus on mitigation at the penalty phase. Corin explained this strategy to Nixon several times, but Nixon was generally unresponsive, never expressly approving or objecting, and later became disruptive and largely absent from trial. At trial, Corin conceded Nixon caused the victim's death, did not present a guilt-phase defense case, but objected to prejudicial evidence, contested jury instructions, and then presented substantial mitigation evidence at sentencing.

Issue

Whether defense counsel's failure to obtain a capital defendant's express consent before conceding guilt at trial automatically renders counsel's performance deficient and presumptively prejudicial. Relatedly, whether such a claim is governed by Cronic or by the ordinary ineffective-assistance standard of Strickland.

Rule

Counsel has a duty to consult with the defendant about important strategic decisions, but need not obtain the defendant's express consent to every tactical decision. When counsel adequately informs a capital defendant of a proposed concession-of-guilt strategy and the defendant is unresponsive, counsel is not automatically barred from pursuing that strategy; the representation is evaluated under Strickland's objective-reasonableness standard, not under Cronic's presumption of prejudice, unless counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In a capital murder trial in Phoenix, defense lawyer Elena Park met with her client, Marcus Velez, four times before trial. She explained that the forensic evidence and two detailed confessions made guilt effectively indisputable, and that her plan was to acknowledge Marcus caused the death so she could preserve credibility for the penalty phase and present mental-health mitigation; Marcus stared silently and never answered yes or no.

If Marcus later claims his lawyer was automatically ineffective because she conceded guilt without his express approval, which is the best answer?

Explanation. The majority held that when counsel adequately informs a capital defendant of a proposed concession strategy and the defendant is unresponsive, counsel is not automatically barred from pursuing it. In that circumstance, the ineffective-assistance claim is judged under Strickland’s objective-reasonableness framework, not Cronic’s presumption of prejudice. The Court rejected the view that such a concession is automatically the equivalent of a guilty plea.