Friedman v. General Motors Corporation

Ohio Court of Appeals, Eighth Appellate District · 1974 · Torts
334 N.E.2d 511 (1974)
Updated
TortsProducts Liabilityautomobile defectscircumstantial evidencereasonable inferencedirected verdictneutral safety switchdefect at time of manufacture

Facts

The Friedman family was in their parked 1965 Oldsmobile Toronado at a gasoline station when Morton Friedman attempted to start it, believing the gears to be in neutral. According to plaintiffs' evidence, the transmission was actually in drive, the engine started when the ignition was turned, and the car leaped forward, struck another car and a light pole, and came to rest at a sign, causing injuries and damage. Plaintiffs' theory was that the neutral safety switch was defective because it allowed the car to start in drive. There was testimony that General Motors set the switch at manufacture and that no changes or adjustments were made from the time the car left the factory until the accident.

Issue

Was there sufficient evidence to allow the jury to infer that the automobile was defective when it left General Motors' hands and that the defect proximately caused plaintiffs' injuries, such that the trial court erred in dismissing the action? More specifically, could the jury infer a defective or maladjusted neutral safety switch from testimony that the engine started while the transmission gears were in drive?

Rule

In automobile product liability cases, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) there was a defect in the product manufactured and sold by the defendant, (2) the defect existed when the product left the defendant's hands, and (3) the defect directly and proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries or loss. The jury may draw logical and immediate inferences from established facts, and direct evidence of the precise mechanical defect is not required where the proved facts reasonably support the inference of defect and causation.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In Columbus, Nina Patel parked her sedan outside a grocery store. She testified that without moving the shift lever, she turned the key, the engine started while the transmission was actually in drive, and the car jumped forward into a cart corral; service records showed the manufacturer set the starting-interlock mechanism at the factory and no one had adjusted it afterward.

Should the trial court grant the manufacturer's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that Nina offered no direct proof of the precise internal malfunction?

Explanation. The governing rule is that in an automobile product-liability case, the plaintiff must show defect, existence of the defect when the product left the manufacturer, and proximate cause. But direct evidence of the exact mechanical problem is not required if established facts support logical and immediate inferences. Evidence that the engine started while the transmission was actually in drive permits an inference that the starting safety mechanism was improperly connected or maladjusted, and evidence that the manufacturer set it and no later adjustments occurred permits an inference that the defect existed when it left the manufacturer.