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Galloway v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States · 1943 · Civil Procedure
Civil ProcedureDirected VerdictSeventh AmendmentSufficiency of the Evidencedirected verdictRule 50Seventh Amendmentsufficiency of evidence

Facts

Petitioner sought benefits on the theory that insanity caused by wartime service had become total and permanent no later than May 31, 1919, when his insurance policy lapsed. His proof included testimony about two abnormal incidents in France, lay testimony that he appeared changed after returning home, later medical diagnoses of psychosis and insanity beginning in 1930, and expert testimony in 1941 retrospectively opining that the disability had existed continuously since 1918 or 1919. The record, however, contained only vague evidence for 1920 to 1922 and was essentially blank for the five-to-eight-year period from 1922 or 1925 to 1930, even though the Court viewed evidence about that period as apparently available. Petitioner was concededly totally and permanently disabled by the time suit was filed in 1938, but the disputed question was whether he had proved that condition by the policy-lapse date.

Issue

Was the evidence legally sufficient to allow a jury to find that petitioner was totally and permanently disabled by insanity no later than May 31, 1919? Relatedly, does directing a verdict for insufficiency of evidence in such circumstances violate the Seventh Amendment?

Rule

A case may be withheld from the jury when, even after making due allowance for all reasonably possible inferences favoring the party bearing the burden, the proof does not supply probative facts and would require speculation to establish an essential element. The Seventh Amendment does not prohibit directed verdict practice; it preserves the fundamental institution of jury trial, not the exact historical procedural incidents of common-law practice in 1791.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In a federal breach-of-contract suit in Denver, Maya Ortiz claims that Summit Vale Logistics orally agreed in March 2018 to a five-year consulting arrangement. She proves only that company officers praised her work in early 2018 and that, in 2023, one officer told a psychiatrist he had "always intended" to keep Maya involved long-term. No witness testifies to any actual contract terms, and no emails or notes are produced although the negotiations occurred at regular staff meetings attended by several available employees.

At the close of Maya's evidence, Summit Vale moves for a directed verdict. How should the court rule?

Explanation. A federal court may withhold a case from the jury when, after giving the nonmoving party all reasonably possible favorable inferences, the proof still lacks probative facts on an essential element and would leave only speculation. The Seventh Amendment does not bar directed verdict practice for insufficiency of evidence. Here, praise for Maya's work and a later generalized statement of intent do not supply concrete evidence of assent and terms for a five-year oral contract, especially where apparently available firsthand proof was not produced.