HomeCase briefs › Civil Procedure

Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co.

Supreme Court of the United States · 1913 · Civil Procedure
Civil ProcedureJury TrialJudgment Non Obstante VeredictoDirected VerdictSeventh AmendmentSeventh Amendmentfederal courtsjury trial

Facts

The insured's policy required annual premium payment, allowed a one-month grace period, and limited nonforfeiture benefits to any reserve exceeding indebtedness to the company. When the November 27, 1907 premium came due, the insured already owed the company $2,360, which represented the full amount of the reserve, so there was no excess reserve to continue coverage automatically. The insured's wife delivered a check for part of the premium during the grace period and received a proposed blue note that had to be signed and returned, but the insured died before signing it. The company later wrote that the remittance was being held subject to the insured's order pending return of the signed note.

Issue

First, whether the evidence legally permitted a finding that the policy was still in force at the insured's death. Second, if the evidence was insufficient and the trial court should have directed a verdict for the defendant, whether the federal appellate court could direct judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the jury's verdict or instead had to award a new trial.

Rule

If, in a federal action at law tried to a jury, the evidence with all justifiable inferences is insufficient to support a verdict for a party, the trial court may and should direct a verdict for the other party. But once a jury has returned a verdict on issues of fact, the Seventh Amendment permits reexamination only according to the rules of the common law, meaning by a new trial in the trial court or by a venire facias de novo ordered by an appellate court for error of law. Common-law judgments non obstante veredicto and arrest of judgment are limited to cases where the pleadings make the verdict immaterial, not where the asserted defect is insufficiency of the evidence.

🔒

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

  • The court's holding and reasoning
  • Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
  • 10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case
Sign up free to see more →
Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In a federal breach-of-warranty action tried to a jury in Denver, Mia Torres sues Front Range Farm Tools, Inc. At the close of all evidence, the company requests a directed verdict, arguing Mia offered no legally sufficient proof that any defect existed when the product left the factory. The judge denies the motion, and the jury returns a verdict for Mia.

If the federal court of appeals later concludes that the trial judge should have directed a verdict for Front Range Farm Tools because Mia's evidence was legally insufficient, what is the proper appellate disposition under the majority rule?

Explanation. In a federal action at law, evidentiary insufficiency may justify a directed verdict at trial. But once a jury has returned a verdict on issues of fact, the Seventh Amendment forbids an appellate court from reexamining those facts by directing final judgment for the other side on the evidence. The proper course is to reverse for the legal error in refusing the directed verdict and award a new trial, unless judgment can be entered solely on the pleadings. (Derived from Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co. (1913).)