Gliddon Co. v. Zdanock

Supreme Court of the United States · 1962 · Federal Courts

Federal CourtsArticle IIIlegislative courtsjudicial assignmentsArticle IIICourt of ClaimsCourt of Customs and Patent Appealsdesignation

Facts

The petitioners challenged judgments entered with the participation of judges from the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals who had been assigned to sit on Article III courts. They argued that under Ex parte Bakelite Corp. and Williams v. United States those originating courts were not Article III courts, so their judges lacked Article III tenure and salary protection and could not validly exercise the judicial power of district courts or courts of appeals. Congress had later declared both originating courts to be courts established under Article III. No complaint was made about either assigned judge's actual conduct or independence in the proceedings themselves.

Issue

Whether judgments were vitiated because they were rendered with the participation of judges of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals sitting by designation, on the theory that those judges lacked Article III status. More broadly, whether those two courts are Article III courts and whether their judges therefore possess constitutionally protected tenure and compensation.

Rule

A litigant may challenge on direct review the constitutional authority of a judge even if the objection was not raised below, where the challenge rests on nonfrivolous constitutional grounds concerning Article III protections. Whether a tribunal is an Article III court depends basically on whether its establishing legislation complies with Article III: whether its business is the federal judicial business specified there and whether its judges and judgments have the independence Article III expressly or impliedly requires. The mere fact that Congress could have assigned a matter to a non-Article III tribunal does not mean that a tribunal it actually created with the appearance and protections of a court is not an Article III court.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In a diversity contract suit in federal court in Chicago, the court of appeals affirms a judgment for Nora Vega. One member of the panel was Judge Eli Mercer, who had been assigned from a specialized federal tribunal whose judges have life tenure and protected salary by statute, but whose constitutional status has long been debated. The losing party, Lakeshore Milling, never objected below and raises for the first time in the Supreme Court that Mercer lacked Article III authority to sit by designation.

How should the Supreme Court treat the challenge?

Explanation. The majority held that a litigant may raise on direct review a nonfrivolous constitutional challenge to a judge's authority when it implicates Article III protections and separation-of-powers concerns, even if no objection was made below. The de facto doctrine does not automatically bar review of such a challenge, and no showing of actual bias is required because Article III protects litigants structurally as well as individually.