Gonzales v. Commonwealth

Court of Appeals of Virginia · 2005 · Evidence

45 Va.App. 375 (2005)

Updated August 22, 2026

Evidenceprior bad actsother crimes evidencerapeconsentintentharmless errorpropensity

Facts

Gonzales responded to Naomi Parrish's advertisement for private dancing and went to her apartment. According to Parrish, after a dispute over payment he blocked the door, pushed her onto the bed, and raped and sodomized her; Gonzales later made phone statements apologizing, though at trial he claimed the sex was consensual. Before trial, the Commonwealth moved to introduce testimony from two other women describing similar sexual assaults by Gonzales. The prosecutor stated the evidence was offered not for identity, but to show Gonzales's intent in going to Parrish's apartment and to rebut his expected consent defense.

Issue

May the Commonwealth introduce evidence that the defendant committed similar sexual crimes against other women to prove his intent in a rape prosecution when the trial issue is whether the encounter with the complainant was consensual or forced? If admission was erroneous, was the error harmless?

Rule

Evidence that an accused committed other crimes is generally inadmissible to prove guilt of the charged crime. Although similar-crimes evidence may be admissible when intent or identity is genuinely in issue and its probative value outweighs prejudice, in a rape case the defendant's intent is established by proof that he knowingly and intentionally committed the acts constituting rape; evidence that he raped other women is generally not relevant to whether the complainant in the charged case consented. Under Code § 8.01-678, nonconstitutional error is harmless only if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the error did not substantially sway the judgment.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Richmond, Lena Ortiz accused Devin Cole of rape after meeting him at her apartment for a paid social visit arranged online. At trial, Devin admitted intercourse occurred but testified that Lena agreed to it; the prosecutor offered testimony from two unrelated women in Norfolk and Roanoke who said Devin had sexually assaulted them in similar apartment encounters, arguing the evidence showed he went to Lena's apartment with the intent to rape her.

Should the trial court admit the two women's testimony for that stated purpose?

Explanation. The majority held that other-crimes evidence is generally inadmissible to prove guilt and cannot be relabeled as proof of "intent" when the true trial issue is consent. In a rape case, the required intent is established by proof that the accused knowingly and intentionally committed the acts constituting the offense; prior rapes of others do not tend to prove that this complainant did not consent. The evidence therefore should be excluded as impermissible propensity evidence.