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Gooding v. Wilson

Supreme Court of the United States · 1972 · Constitutional Law

Constitutional LawFirst AmendmentOverbreadthVaguenessFighting WordsFirst Amendmentoverbreadthvagueness

Facts

Georgia Code Ann. § 26-6303 made it a misdemeanor, without provocation, to use to or of another in his presence opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of the peace. Wilson was convicted on two counts under that statute after using abusive and threatening language toward police officers during an incident at a building being picketed. In federal habeas proceedings, the only issue reached was whether the statute was facially unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The case turned not on Wilson's specific words alone, but on whether Georgia courts had authoritatively limited the statute to unprotected fighting words.

Issue

Whether Georgia Code Ann. § 26-6303, which punishes the use of opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of the peace, is facially unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because, as construed by Georgia courts, it is vague and overbroad rather than limited to fighting words.

Rule

A state statute regulating speech is facially invalid unless it is carefully drawn or authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech, such as fighting words, and is not susceptible of application to protected expression. In the First Amendment context, a defendant may raise facial overbreadth and vagueness even if his own conduct might have been punishable under a narrower law.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

Oregon makes it a misdemeanor to direct "abusive or insulting words tending to disturb public order" at another person. Oregon appellate decisions have upheld convictions for rude epithets shouted at sanitation workers and for mocking comments made to a parking attendant, even where the remarks were offensive but not likely to provoke an immediate fight.

If Maya Torres is prosecuted under that statute for a face-to-face insult that arguably could qualify as fighting words, what is her strongest constitutional argument?

Explanation. When a statute punishes only spoken words, it can stand only if it is carefully drawn or authoritatively construed so that it is not susceptible of application to protected expression. Under the majority's reasoning, it does not matter that Maya's own words might have been punishable under a narrower fighting-words statute; she may still raise facial overbreadth where the statute, as construed, extends beyond fighting words.