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Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire

Supreme Court of the United States · 1942 · Constitutional Law

First Amendmentfighting wordsunprotected speechcategorical exclusionsFourteenth Amendmentfree speechfighting wordsbreach of the peace

Facts

Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, was distributing sect literature on a busy street in Rochester, New Hampshire, when citizens complained that he was denouncing religion as a "racket." After police warned him that the crowd was getting restless and a disturbance occurred, Chaplinsky encountered the city marshal and addressed him with the words charged in the complaint: "You are a God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists." He admitted saying the charged words except for the name of the Deity. At trial, the court excluded evidence about his religious mission, the crowd's treatment of him, and alleged police neglect, treating provocation and truth as immaterial.

Issue

Whether New Hampshire's statute, as applied to Chaplinsky's face-to-face epithets to a public officer in a public place, violated the Fourteenth Amendment by unreasonably restricting freedom of speech or by being vague and indefinite. The Court also considered whether the excluded evidence created any constitutional problem.

Rule

The right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, including the insulting or "fighting" words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace—which may be prevented and punished without raising a constitutional problem. A statute limited to face-to-face words likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee is not unconstitutional or impermissibly vague.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

During a street festival in Cleveland, Nina Porter steps directly in front of Omar Ruiz on a crowded public sidewalk and shouts, "You filthy crook," followed by a profane epithet. Witnesses say the remarks were delivered face-to-face in an angry tone and immediately drew gasps from bystanders.

If Ohio prosecutes Nina under a statute that the state supreme court has narrowly construed to reach only face-to-face words plainly likely to provoke the addressee to an immediate breach of the peace, Nina's best First Amendment argument is likely to fail because:

Explanation. The majority held that the right of free speech is not absolute and that narrowly limited categories, including insulting or fighting words, may be punished. Fighting words are those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. A statute limited to face-to-face words likely to provoke the average addressee to fight is constitutional as applied to such epithets.