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Stromberg v. California

Supreme Court of the United States · 1931 · Constitutional Law

Constitutional LawFreedom of SpeechFourteenth AmendmentVaguenessfree speechdue processFourteenth Amendmentvagueness

Facts

California Penal Code § 403-a made it a felony to display a flag in public as a sign of opposition to organized government, as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action, or as an aid to propaganda of a seditious character. Appellant, a nineteen-year-old supervisor at a children's summer camp, directed a daily ceremony in which children raised a red flag described as a reproduction of the Soviet Russian and Communist Party flag and recited a pledge to the worker's red flag and the working class. A camp library contained radical communist literature inciting violence, but the stipulation stated that none of that literature was used in teaching and that no word of violence, anarchism, or sedition was used in appellant's instruction. The jury was instructed that it could convict if the flag was displayed for any one of the statute's three purposes, and it returned a general verdict.

Issue

Whether appellant's conviction could stand when the jury was allowed to convict under any of three statutory clauses and one clause, as construed by the state court, was so vague and indefinite that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty, including free speech. Also, whether the clause forbidding display of a flag as a sign, symbol, or emblem of opposition to organized government was facially invalid.

Rule

The liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the right of free speech, though the State may punish utterances that incite violence, crime, or the unlawful overthrow of organized government. A statute is unconstitutional on its face if, as authoritatively construed, it is so vague and indefinite that it permits punishment of peaceful and orderly political opposition and the fair use of free political discussion. When a general verdict may have rested on any of several independent statutory grounds, and one such ground is unconstitutional, the conviction cannot be upheld.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Oregon, a statute makes it a crime to display any emblem in a public park either (1) as a symbol of opposition to organized government, (2) as an invitation to violent lawlessness, or (3) as support for propaganda advocating forcible overthrow of government. A state appellate court has construed clause (1) to cover peaceful, lawful political dissent. Lena Ortiz is convicted after the jury is instructed it may convict if any one clause is proved, and the jury returns a general verdict.

Should Lena's conviction be upheld?

Explanation. Under the majority rule, a conviction under a general verdict cannot stand when the jury was permitted to convict on any of several independent statutory grounds and one of those grounds is unconstitutional. A clause that, as authoritatively construed, reaches peaceful and orderly political opposition and lawful political discussion is facially invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the verdict does not reveal which clause the jury used, the conviction must be set aside.