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Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Torts
TortsProducts liabilityFailure to warnNegligenceStrict liabilitySuperseding causeSummary judgmentadequate warning

Facts

Westinghouse sold a Model 144-GC-500 oil circuit breaker to Wisconsin Public Service Corporation in 1964, and in 1979 the breaker exploded while WPS employees were testing it, seriously injuring three men and killing one. By late 1964 and early 1965, Westinghouse had learned that this model could fail because arcing could occur from the main contact to the dashpot through a line of oil-air bubbles; its engineer developed a dashpot baffle to prevent that malfunction. Westinghouse notified WPS by letter in April 1965 that seven failures had occurred among over 2,000 breakers, offered to provide baffles for installation by WPS personnel at a convenient time, and stated it did not believe immediate installation was necessary. WPS requested baffles for seven breakers, but Westinghouse shipped six; baffles were installed on some breakers, but not on the breaker that later exploded, and the parties agreed the accident would not have occurred had the baffle been properly installed.

Issue

Whether Westinghouse was entitled to summary judgment on the ground that its warning letter and furnishing of uninstalled baffles constituted an adequate warning as a matter of law. Also, whether WPS's failure to install the baffle was a superseding cause that relieved Westinghouse of liability as a matter of law.

Rule

Under Wisconsin law, a manufacturer has a duty to warn customers or users of defective conditions and associated risks, and that duty can extend to dangers discovered after marketing. The adequacy of a warning is generally a question of fact for the jury, evaluated case by case in light of the product's danger, the clarity and intensity of the warning, the status and knowledge of the user, and whether the danger was open and obvious. A manufacturer may also have a duty to install safety devices to remedy post-sale defects, and intervening negligence by a third party does not become a superseding cause unless it was unforeseeable.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In 2012, Summit Forge Systems sold a metal-cutting press to a fabrication plant in Toledo, Ohio. Two years later, Summit learned that under low-load cycling the press could eject a steel pin unless a newly designed guard plate was added; it mailed the plant a letter stating that the problem had occurred only rarely, enclosed a free guard plate, and said installation could wait until the next routine shutdown. A line worker was later injured on the unmodified press.

If the worker sues Summit for negligence and strict products liability based on inadequate warning, which is the best ruling on Summit's motion for summary judgment?

Explanation. The majority treated warning adequacy as a factual issue ordinarily for the jury, especially where the manufacturer knew of a serious risk, used language that may have minimized the danger, and merely sent an uninstalled corrective device without follow-up. The same reasoning applies here. A failure to provide adequate warnings may render a product defective and unreasonably dangerous for strict liability purposes, and also support negligence.