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Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward County

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · Constitutional Law

Constitutional Lawcivil contemptappellate processsubject matter of litigationresistance to processtuition grantspending appealanticipatory resistance

Facts

During litigation over reopening Prince Edward County public schools, plaintiffs appealed the district court's refusal to enjoin future tuition grants to private schools. While that appeal was pending, and after the Clerk sought a stipulation that no grants be paid before the normal processing time, Board members met on August 4-5, 1964, substantially increased the 1964-65 tuition grants, and arranged for immediate overnight processing and payment of about $180,000 before the court could act. The district court later found the payments were formally for the 1964-65 school year and therefore did not violate its July 9, 1964 order barring retroactive 1963-64 grants. Plaintiffs nonetheless sought contempt on the ground that the Board had deliberately put the disputed funds beyond the court's reach while the appeal was under consideration.

Issue

Whether a county board commits civil contempt of the court of appeals by disbursing disputed public funds during a pending appeal in order to place the subject matter of the litigation beyond the court's control, even though no specific appellate injunction then expressly forbade the disbursement. A secondary issue was whether the district court improperly reduced attorney's fees based on counsel's failure to pursue the state-court route the district judge had suggested.

Rule

A court may hold a party in civil contempt when, during the pendency of an appeal or other live process, the party willfully removes or places beyond the court's reach the subject matter of the litigation so as to defeat, impair, or thwart the effectiveness of the court's ultimate decree. The contempt power under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) is not limited to violation of an already outstanding injunction; anticipatory resistance to a lawful process or likely decree concerning the specific subject in dispute may suffice.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Dayton, Ohio, a city arts commission is appealing a district court’s refusal to bar it from using a dedicated municipal heritage fund to subsidize a private academy that excludes applicants on racial grounds. While the appeal is pending and after learning the court is considering expedited review, the commissioners meet late at night and distribute the entire fund to the academy’s families before any stay issues.

May the appellate court hold the commissioners in civil contempt even though no order then expressly forbade those payments?

Explanation. The majority held that civil contempt may rest on anticipatory resistance to a live judicial process. A pending appeal is itself a lawful process, and a party may not willfully remove the specific subject matter of that appeal from the court’s control in order to defeat the decree the court might ultimately enter. The absence of a presently extant injunction specifically forbidding the act does not preclude contempt where the conduct was designed to render appellate relief nugatory. (Derived from Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward County (n.d.).)